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Abstract
The purpose of this study was to describe the factors that influenced the board of
trustees at Mississippi College and Georgetown College, KY to sever governance ties
with their respective state Baptist Conventions and to describe the impact of the decision
on the college administration, academic operations, lay governance structure and
denominational relationship on the two institutions. The research questions guiding this
study were:
1. What were the factors that influenced the decision-making process to make a
change in governance relationship between the institution and the state Baptist
convention?
2. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the college administrative and academic
operations, lay governance structure and denominational relationships?
Data for this study was collected from 46 in-depth, one-on-one interviews with
the current and former presidents, trustees, faculty members, the college legal counsel
and the current and former executive directors of the state Baptist conventions.
Additional data was collected from observations, field notes, media sources and internal
college documents.
The findings indicated four themes emerged as factors that influenced the board
of trustees’ decision at Mississippi College and five themes emerged as factors that
influenced the board of trustees’ at Georgetown College. A cross-case analysis of the
data revealed that two themes at both institutions correlated with the remaining themes
independent to their respective institutions. In both cases the findings indicated that the
vi

trustees’ decision had no impact on the college administration or academic operation;
however, there was a substantial impact on the lay governance structure and relationship
with the state Baptist conventions.
It is suggested from these findings that factors which influence the decisionmaking process of lay governing boards in higher education and the outcomes of these
decisions are just as complex, complicated and divergent as those in the for-profit sector.
The study provides discussion on the conclusions, current implications and
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Background of the Study
What factors influence the decision-making process of institutions and/or
organizations to make changes? As Bolman and Deal (2003) indicate, the past 75 years
of organizational theory literature has produced an enormous amount of research which
has examined and debated the numerous dimensions of the impact of this question. Just
as in the many scientific fields within organizational research, there has not emerged a
single theory of everything to explain how all organizations and institutions are managed,
operated, changed and governed (Bogue and Aper, 2000). In fact, Bolman and Deal
(2003) indicate there are “multiple voices” or “frames” (p. 12) within organizational
theory literature that attempt to understand the operational and decision-making processes
in institutions and organizations. Bolman and Deal (1984 & 2003) made a significant
contribution to the body of research by consolidating the variant strands within the
organizational theory literature into four frames: (1) structural frame, (2) human resource
frame, (3) political frame and (4) symbolic frame.
The “structural frame emphasizes goals, specialized roles and formal
relationships” and draws on the research of “sociology and management sciences” to
understand personal structures and operational processes of an institution and
organization (Bolman & Deal, p.14). Examining institutions and organizations through
the human resource frame (p. 14) focuses on the importance of the individual and what
each person has to offer in terms of their skills, abilities, motives, limitations and life
1

experiences. The research theory behind the human resource frame is based in the field
of human psychology. Bolman and Deal (2003) do not speak of the political frame
utilizing the language of government or the public arena of politics but define it as
“simply the realistic process of making decisions and allocating resources in a context of
scarcity and divergent interests” (p. 181). The political frame draws on the theories of
political science and views decision-making as a political process between individuals
and groups prompted by the internal and external environments of the institution and
organization (Cyert & March, 1963; Pfeiffer, 1981; Pfeiffer & Salancik, 1978).
Borrowing from the fields of “social and cultural anthropology” the symbolic
frame seeks to examine institutions and organizations as “propelled by rituals,
ceremonies, stories, heroes, and myths rather by rules, policies and managerial authority”
(Bolman & Deal, 2003, p. 15). Currently, within the research of organizational theory,
each of these “frames” provide important insight and understanding on how institutions
and organizations operate but only one, the political frame, takes into consideration the
overall decision-making processes of the factors that influence these entities.
The current research of organizational theory that supports the political frame
provides beneficial insight to the operational and decision-making processes of
institutions and organizations. However, several issues emerge in applying the political
frame to higher educational institutions. While colleges and universities represent some
of the oldest continually operating corporations in the United States (Brubacher & Rudy,
1958; Thelin, 2004) and “are also among the more complex organizational entities”
(Bogue and Aper, 2000, p.36), applying these research principles to higher education may
2

be difficult. Lohmann (2004) argues that levels of “deep specialization” in higher
education institutions create complexity that other corporate institutions do not possess
(p. 86). In addition, Kaplan (2004) indicates that one of the primary reasons “for the
dearth of large-scale survey work in higher education governance stems from the
particular challenges involved in using questionnaires to gain a picture of decision
practices from campus to campus” (p. 169).
Second, current research on higher education institutional decision-making
focuses on the structural frame (Bolman & Deal, 2003). While Hammond (2004) does
not utilize the structural frame nomenclature of Bolman and Deal (2003), for Hammond
(2004) it is the hierarchal internal structure of the university that drives the decisionmaking processes in terms of how administration identifies critical issues that need
resolution, responds to the particular situation and brings resolution to the matter.
According to Hammond (2004), “how much impact any given kind of structure actually
has on any university’s decision-making processes and outcomes is an empirical matter”
and the fact that “different kinds of structures in different universities actually lead to the
different kinds of decision-making processes and outcomes” (p. 137-138). In addition,
Hermalin (2004) concluded that until further research is conducted to the contrary, the
current model of hierarchical lay governance structure is the most appropriate model in
understanding the decision-making processes that take place in higher education
institutions.
Third, Bogue and Aper (2000) posit that a more applicable frame to understand
higher education institutions would be the collegial frame (p. 38). This frame implies
3

that colleges and universities have evolved to a new level in operational and decisionmaking processes that are no longer hierarchical and now place “a high degree of
emphasis on consensus decision-making, professional expertise, and autonomy of the
faculty” (p. 16). The research that underpins the collegial frame is the development and
practice of “shared authority” or “shared governance” in higher education institutions
(Bogue & Aper, 2000). Duderstadt (2004) identifies three levels of shared governance
that effect decision-making in higher education; (1) the faculty appointment and tenure
process, (2) election to a faculty or academic senate that provides advice to
administration and trustees, and (3) the level of research that faculty provide which
generates financial support through grants and contracts. It is important to note that
Duderstadt (2004) warns that the term “shared governance” can be misleading. Through
the collegial frame and “shared governance” faculty are delegated academic and
budgetary functions, but “by law or by charter, essentially all the legal powers of the
university are held by its governing board” (p. 140).
Fourth, the research conducted to this point in organizational theory examining
the political frame has primarily originated in the for-profit corporate sector (Barnard,
1938; Bolman & Deal, 2003; Child, 1972; Cyert & March, 1963; Finklestein &
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Mace, 1971; Pfeffer
1981; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Scott, 1995; Selznick, 1957) and making application of
this research to higher education institutions has limitations. However limited, research
in organizational theory has begun to focus attention on the non-profit and higher
education institutions (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hermalin, 2004; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992;
4

Kraatz, 1998; and Kraatz and Moore, 2002). Bolman and Deal (2003) do not limit the
research capabilities of the four frames to for-profit corporations. In fact, “[a]s
organizations have become pervasive and dominant, they have also become formidably
difficult to understand and manage” (p. 18). Therefore, since higher education
institutions have continued to become more complex as corporate entities in the world
(Duderstadt, 2004), utilizing multiple frames would be an appropriate method for a
deeper understanding of organizational decision-making. However, it is imperative to
start any organizational analysis with the most plausible frame to understanding the
current “situation at hand” (Bolman & Deal, p. 15).
When any institution or organization is attempting to understand a particular
issue, crisis or phenomenon related to the decision-making process, funding allocation,
limited resources and conflicting interests, Bolman and Deal (2003) state that the political
frame provides the best starting point for analysis since “[t]his view puts politics at the
heart of decision-making” (p. 181). Within the political frame, Bolman and Deal (2003)
identify three factors that can exert political influence on the decision-making processes
in and/or on institutions and organizations; power, conflict and coalitions.
Power is defined in its simplest form as “basically the capacity to get things done”
(p. 188). The second factor is conflict which is not viewed from a negative perspective
but something that is “natural and inevitable” (p.197). What is most important about
conflict is the ability to manage and deal with it in organizations (Bolman and Deal,
2003). A coalition is the final factor that has influence in the political frame and consists
of “individuals and groups [that have] insular objectives and resources, and they bargain
5

with other players to influence goals and objectives” (p. 190). According to Bolman and
Deal (2003), each of these factors individually, in tandem or collectively, influences the
political nature of the decision-making process of institutions and organizations. While
the review of literature of organizational theory, and particularly the political frame, has
been useful to understanding for-profit corporations, it has had limited impact on higher
education institutions, public or private.
One particular area of higher education that appears to have experienced political
influence over the past twenty years is private Baptist colleges and universities, primarily
located in the south. Since 1986, 17 Baptist colleges and universities have severed
governance ties with their sponsoring state Baptist conventions. Baptist state papers,
higher education publications, local and national newspapers and publications, and
internet sources have chronicled the contentious nature of dissolving these historic
relationships with stories and headlines like, “Southern Baptist colleges are caught up in
bitter conflicts plaguing the powerful denomination” (McMurtrie, 2003), “College,
Baptists will loosen ties” (Smith, 2005), Georgia Supreme Court rules against Shorter
(College) in dispute with (Georgia) Baptist Convention” (Pierce, 2005), “Georgia Baptist
Convention severs ties with university” (Turner, 2006), “Tennessee Baptist group sues
Belmont University for return of contributions” (Porter, 2006), and “Plan allows N.C.
colleges to elect trustees but give up funding” (Cartledge, 2007). The headlines and these
articles express the influences of the political frame and the factors of power, conflict and
coalitions. In addition, they reflect the actions taken by the presidents and the board of
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trustees at several Baptist colleges and universities and responses of leadership in the
sponsoring Baptist state conventions.
At the heart of the debate is the critical question - does the ultimate governance
authority and control of these Baptist colleges and universities reside with the trustees or
sponsoring state Baptist conventions? Most of the debate, discussion and concern over
control of the Baptist seminaries, colleges and universities was generated in the
ideological and theological controversies within the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC)
and some state Baptist conventions which erupted in 1979 (Fletcher, 1994; James, Leazer
& Shoopman, 1999; & Leonard, 1990). As Bogue and Aper (2003) recognize,
“institutions have pulled away from religious fellowships and established selfperpetuating boards. This complex interaction between campuses and their religious
sponsors is often a difficult concept to explain” (p.48). However, the phenomenon that
has occurred in Baptist higher education reflects the hallmark of the political frame and
involves the factors associated with power, conflict and coalitions.

Statement of the Problem
Over the past 100 years of research minuscule attention has been given to
examining nonprofit and higher education institutions (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Judge &
Zeithaml, 1992; Kraatz, 1998 and Kraatz and Moore, 2002). While the research indicates
that college and university governing boards serve an important role in higher education
(Bogue & Aper, 2000; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hammond, 2004; Heller, 2004; Hermalin,
2004; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Kraatz, 1998, and Kraatz and Moore, 2002) and that
7

trustees make strategic decisions in relationship to the sponsoring religious body (Bogue
& Aper, 2000; Falkner, 1993; Taylor 2000), we know very little about the factors that
influence their decision-making process. In particular and the problem this research
attempts to answer, it is not known what lead the Trustees of Mississippi College and
Georgetown College to make the decision to sever governing ties with their respective
state Baptist conventions.
Purpose of the Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this study was (1) to describe the factors that influenced the board
of trustees at Mississippi College and Georgetown College, KY to sever governance ties
with their respective state Baptist Conventions and (2) to describe the impact of the
decision on the college administration, academic operations, the lay governance structure
and denominational relationship on the two institutions. The research questions guiding
this study were:
1. What were the factors that influenced the decision-making process to make a
change in governance relationship between the institution and the state Baptist
Convention?
2. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the college administrative and academic
operations, lay governance structure and denominational relationships?

Theoretical Framework
As previously noted, the political frame of organizational theory research in forprofit institutions indicated that three factors have political influence on the decisionmaking processes of institutions and organizations (Bolman & Deal, 2003). The three
8

factors of the political frame that influence institutional decision-making are (1) power,
(2) conflict and (3) coalitions.
Because of the limited research related to the decision-making process of
governing boards in higher education, it is proposed that utilizing a theoretical framework
for the for-profit literature might serve as a lens to examine this process. In using a
theoretical framework for this study, the political frame of Bolman and Deal (2003)
provided context for the research, explored the research questions and framed the
structure for data analysis of the phenomenon.

Significance of the Study
The present study enhances the limited body of literature which has examined the
factors which led Baptist higher education institutions to sever governance ties with their
sponsoring state Baptist conventions. Exploring the factors which led the phenomenon
can add information and data to the history of Baptists, Baptist higher education and the
two institutions that participated in the study. In addition, this research can add to the
body of literature which has examined other sectarian colleges and universities and their
sponsoring religious bodies and the factors that can have an impact on those
relationships. The investigation of this phenomenon not only expands the current
research of organizational theory, but also informs research for higher education, in both
public and private institutions. And finally, the study could determine if the political
frame of Bolman and Deal (2003) can provide insight to governing bodies on what
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influences their decision-making processes in higher educations as it has in the for-profit
sector.

Limitations of the Study
There were two limits to the study. First, the limitation was only in two private
non-profit Baptist higher education institutions were used for the study. Second, due to
sensitive nature of the topic, the individuals participating may have been reluctant so
share their complete knowledge of the situation regarding the phenomenon and the
research questions or may not have direct first-hand knowledge of the events.

Delimitations
The focus of this research was delimited to a convenient sample of participants
from two private Baptist higher education institutions in the southeast. While seeking
rich understanding of the governance decision-making phenomenon in these settings, the
findings may not be generalized to the population of other Baptist colleges or universities
or to other higher education institutions.

Definition of Terms
Southern Baptist Convention (SCB) –
organized in 1845 in Augusta, Georgia, has grown into a national network of
more than forty-five thousand churches and church-type missions with nearly
sixteen million members who worship in more than two dozen languages each
week across the United States and its territories. The term "Southern Baptist
10

Convention" refers both to the eleven ministry entities supported by Southern
Baptists and to the annual meeting when messengers to the Convention assemble
in a host city to transact the business of the Convention.
(http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/default.asp)
State Baptist Conventions – (i.e., Mississippi Baptist Convention (MBC), Kentucky
Baptist Convention (GBC)), there are 42 state Baptist convention’s made up of
association of churches throughout a state that support “cooperative missions and
ministry organization” through financial support. This support can include higher
education institutions within the state. These Baptist colleges and universities have no
direct relationship to the SBC. (www.kybaptist.org/about/)

Cooperative Program – SBC churches provide a percentage of their weekly gifts to the
state Baptist “convention to support a wide array of ministries and missions including:
evangelism efforts, children’s homes, volunteer missions, missions education, new
churches, colleges and universities, collegiate ministries, camps, and much more.”
The state Baptist convention then sends a percentage of the gifts provided by the
local churches to the SBC. “These gifts are used by Southern Baptist entities to send and
support missionaries, train pastors, and other ministry leaders; provide relief for retired
ministers and widows; and address social, moral, and ethical concerns relating to our
faith and families.” (www.cpmissions.net/2003/)

11

Organization of the Study
The study is presented in eight chapters. Chapter One introduced the background
of the study, included the problem statement, description of the theoretical framework,
the purpose statement, the research questions, the limitations of the study, the
delimitation, and the organization of the study. In Chapter Two the literature of lay
governance in American higher education, Baptist higher education in America, Baptist
models of lay governance, how state Baptist convention relate to the governance and
financial structure of the colleges and universities and review of current literature
regarding Baptist colleges and universities severing governance ties with state Baptist
conventions.
Chapter Three details the research design methods and procedures followed in the
study. The chapter details the research questions, research design, sites and individuals
participating in the study, sources of data, types of data collected and the procedures for
collecting the data, the data analysis and the trustworthiness of the data.
Chapter Four details the findings from the case study of Mississippi College.
Chapter Five details the findings from the case study of Georgetown College. Chapter
Six details the findings cross-case analysis between Mississippi College and Georgetown
College. And Chapter Seven includes a summary of the findings, discussion of the
findings, conclusion and recommendations and implications for future research on the
topic.

12

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature

This chapter begins with an exploration of the literature that examines the
formation of lay governance in American higher education. The following section will
review the literature that examines the development and expansion of Baptist higher
education and the emergence of religious and academic conflict in Baptist higher
education. The chapter will conclude with a review of current literature on Baptist higher
education and governance changes.

Lay Governance Tradition in American Higher Education
The establishment and practice of lay governance is without a doubt one of, if not
the most, significant distinctions of American higher education. Kerr and Gade (1989)
characterize the importance of developing this model of institutional governance as a
“gift of history”. Much debate surrounds the question of exactly how or why this form
of educational governance was chosen or utilized and what previous forms of governance
had the greatest influence on the model that developed in colonial higher education
(Martorana, 1963).
It has been suggested that the lay governance model fit the emergence of a
“democratic society” that was concerned with government power and control (Bogue &
Aper, 2004). John Thelin, in his book, A history of American higher education (2004)
proposes that the “New World college-founders…detested the sloth and autonomy of the
Oxford scholars…therefore looked to the Scottish universities’ reliance on an external
13

board – rather than faculty control” (p. 11). A more practical possibility could simply be
the lack of qualified faculty that had made their way from England to the colonies at the
time Harvard College was chartered in 1637 or later at the other nine colonial colleges,
thus creating the need for other options of governance to be considered (Burns, 1966).
Brubacher and Rudy (1958) indicate that while a significant portion of men in the
colonies were educated, many of those decided to serve the growing congregational
pulpits, “consequently there was no class of professional teachers from which to organize
an autonomous faculty when America’s first colleges took form” (p. 26).
Whether as a form of rebellion against the faculty controlled institutions of
England, student controlled European institutions (Thelin, 2004), expression of a new
sense of freedom from the English Monarch (Sloan, 1971), an intentional decision
(Brubacher and Rudy, 1958), a practical necessity (Burns, 1966) or a combination of
several of these factors, a Board of Overseers comprised of twelve laymen was elected to
govern the colony’s first institution, Harvard College in 1642 (Morison, 1968).
Following Harvard, lay governance quickly emerged as the pre-eminent model of
institutional oversight for new colleges established in the colonies.
It could be easily argued that the lay governance structure created by the founders
of Harvard College may have provided the nurturing concept that not only could higher
education institutions be administered “by and for the people”, but so could a
government, becoming possibly the most significant event to impact the future
establishment of the United States as well (Ingram, 1993; Morison, 1968; Thelin, 2004).
Whether there was a single or multiple influences on the development of the system, lay
14

governance became the hallmark of the American higher education system (Bogue &
Aper, 2000; Ingram, 1993; Medders & Bogue, 2005 & Thelin, 2004).

Models, Assets, and Liabilities of Lay Governance
Out of this early form of lay governance in higher education in the United States,
two different models emerged. The first and oldest lay governance model developed in
the colonial institutions was the self-perpetuating lay governing board (Brubacher &
Rudy, 1958; Ingram, 1993; Morison, 1968; Thelin, 2004). The self-perpetuating board is
primarily identified today with the private sector of higher education (Chait, Holland &
Taylor, 1993). A self-perpetuating board means that “new board members are selected
by existing members” (Bogue & Aper, 2000, p. 48). Within private higher education,
there also exists a variation of the self-perpetuating board. “In some cases, religious
bodies hold the right to appoint some members of the board for private institutions having
religious affiliation.” (p. 48). The ability of a sponsoring religious body to appoint or
elect board members can be a part of the original charter language or through amending
the charter to agreements of financial support (Badgett, 2006; Hester, 1968).
The second lay governance model was developed in public and state sponsored
institutions. Members of public institution’s governing boards “may be elected to office,
as in the case in Illinois and South Carolina, or appointed to office --- usually by the
governor with advice and consent of legislature” (p. 48). While this is the former model
of appointment to state institution governing boards, this has not always been the
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standard of practice as there was limited delineation between private and public higher
education in colonial America (Brubacher & Rudy, 1958; Heller, 2004; & Thelin, 2004).
When the University of Georgia, originally known as Franklin College, was
chartered in 1785 as the first public institution, the governing board was self-perpetuating
and called for representation from the clergy (Brubacher & Rudy, 1958; Corson, 1960;
Martorana, 1963; Thelin, 2004). This was also the case with the founding of the
University of Vermont in 1791, where the “charter treated the trustees as if they were
private individuals rather than public officials.” While some of these early state
institutions received limited state subsidies, “their control can best be described as ‘quasipublic’ because of the degree of autonomy granted to their trustees” (Heller, 2004, p. 50).
As Thelin (2003) indicates, “[t]he fusion of ‘public’ and ‘private’ concepts within the
same institutions was standard practice in the early nineteenth century” and there was no
“substantive distinction between” the two (p. 71).
It is the United States Supreme Court case of Dartmouth College vs. Woodward
of March, 1819 that many will argue “clarified the distinction between public and private
colleges and universities in the United States” (Heller, 2004, p. 51). However, Thelin
(2004) argues that a “reconstruction of the events suggests that this claim is less a valid
conclusion” and “the ruling’s limited applicability to American higher education” (p. 70).
Because of political factions and sectarian descent in New Hampshire, the state
legislature attempted to rule the original British crown charter null and void and replace
the self-perpetuating Dartmouth College trustees with a newly state appointed Dartmouth
University board. Ultimately, through the appeal process, the case made it to the Supreme
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Court which ruled that the state had no legal right to dissolve the Dartmouth College
board of trustees (Brubacher & Rudy, 1958; Heller, 2004; Rudolph, 1962; Thelin, 2004).
As Thelin (2004) concludes,
[f]irst, the case had far more importance for contracts associated with business
and commercial corporations than it did for colleges and universities. Second,
Chief Justice John Marshall and Dartmouth attorney Daniel Webster relied on a
peculiar definition of ‘eleemosynary institutions’ to categorize a college. The term
refers more to charitable trusts, foundations, scholarship societies, and agencies
whose purpose is to gather and then distribute donated funds, as distinct from a
college or university whose primary purpose is to teach and confer degrees (p.
71).
And finally, Thelin (2004) pointed out that “if this court ruling gave specific
designation to ‘private’ colleges, by implication there must also have existed ‘state’ or
‘public’ colleges at that time. Certainly this was not the case in New Hampshire.
Dartmouth was its only college.” (p. 71).
In 1819 there were still no more than 20 colleges in the colonies and the Franklin
College (now the University of Georgia) was the only existing public institution chartered
by a state. With each of these early state institutions were governed by a selfperpetuating board it clearly gives more credence to Thelin’s (2004) conclusions.
The major outcome of the Dartmouth case was not the clear separation between
public and private higher education but the desire of states to actually create independent
public institutions no longer influenced by sectarian interests. Thomas Jefferson (who
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had as early as 1779 attempted to exert greater legislative influence, governance control
and appointment powers of the trustees over his alma mater, the College of William &
Mary) would express this same opinion and necessity in the Dartmouth case to no avail
(Brubacher & Rudy, 1958, Rudolph, 1962).
Because Jefferson was unable to influence and garner state control at either
William & Mary or Dartmouth, he was determined that when “America’s first real state
university” was established later in 1819 as the University of Virginia that (1) the
governor would have appointive powers over the governing board, (2) the university
would receive capital and annual operational funding, (3) the university would have no
direct external sectarian influence and (4) tuition assistance would be made available for
worthy students who could not afford the expense of higher education (Heller, 2004).
With the founding of the University of Virginia, states would gradually begin to
place greater emphasis on governance appointment; however, it would not be until the
Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, and the major expansion of public higher education in
the late 19th century, that states would build in these constitutional provisions for control
and financial subsidies (Brubacher & Rudy, 1958; Corson, 1960; Heller, 2004;
Martorana, 1963; Rudolph, 1962; Thelin, 2004).
What has evolved into the current system and function in both the public and
private models of governance is that,
an independent panel of intelligent lay trustees will bring a fresh and
unencumbered view to program, personnel, and policy issues of a campus or
system of campuses and serve as a useful public accountability panel. The theory
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also embraces board responsibility to connect a college to its supporting
constituencies, to ensure fiscal viability and stewardship, and to buffer the faculty
from unwarranted and impeding external influences as the faculty seeks to
discern, transmit, and publish the truth (Bogue & Medders, 2005, p. 1).
There are several positive aspects to current lay governance models. First, lay
governing boards protect against a “monopoly of power” and create a level of “checks
and balance” between the multiple constituency groups inside and outside a higher
education institution (Bogue & Aper, p. 46). Second, these boards serve as buffers that
“hold the academy accountable to the public and protect the academy from the caprices
and entanglement of political life” (p. 46) and sectarian scrutiny. Third, trustees apply
their professional expertise to bear on the diverse decision-making processes of the
institution (Hermalin, 2004). Fourth, as governing boards make critical policy decisions
for the institution, they are able to detach themselves emotionally from the issue and
make objective, data-driven and informed decisions (Keller, 2004). Finally, the
heterogeneous membership of a lay governing board allows for multiple perspectives and
opinions on a particular issue before determining the final course of action or decisions
(Corson, 1960).
While lay governing boards have positive attributes, there are some liabilities to
the system. Hermalin (2004) identifies seven liabilities: (1) trustees are dependent of
administration to provide accurate information, (2) trustees have their own professional
responsibilities and lack the time to commit to the institutions, (3) each trustee on the
board does not provide the same level of commitment to their responsibilities, (4) trustees
19

may provide less oversight when the president is successful, and believe the institution is
functioning properly, (5) coalitions develop between faculty, students and the president
which are able to bargain with the trustees thereby minimizing their power, (6) trustees
may provide less oversight when members are added due to financial contributions or to
expand the heterogeneity of the board, and (7) power struggles, conflict and coalitions
among trustees can minimize their effectiveness and impact decision-making.
Bogue and Aper (2000) provide additional liabilities that the lay governing board
may exhibit specific to public and private institutions. First, in public institutions,
governors have demonstrated a willingness to utilize the trustee selection process to
accomplish a political agenda within the institution. However, for the most part
mechanisms have been put in place to promote a balance of influence and representation
and “[w]hether elected or appointed for public institutions, trustees serve limited terms,
often designed so that political influence is balanced and a single governor is not able to
completely appoint a board (and) [i]n some cases, authorizing laws will specify regional
and even political party representation” (p. 49).
Second, private institutions may attempt to populate a self-perpetuating board of
trustees with individuals who hold minority or even counter religious or theological
perspectives not embraced by the majority of the denomination or body they represent.
Even in those institutions that have severed governance ties with the original sponsoring
body, trustees are more likely to be selected to protect and preserve the specific
academic, social and religious heritage.

20

Third, lay governing boards are still primarily homogenous and lack the general
population and constituent representation. “[T]he majority of the 40,000 board members
serving public and private colleges across the nation are white males, though the
percentage of men has declined from virtually 100 percent in the early part of this century
to 73 percent in the early 1990’s” (p. 49).
Currently, the limited higher education literature that has examined lay governing
boards has focused on either the structural model (Hammond, 2004; Hermalin, 2004;
Keller, 2004) or the collegial model (Bogue & Aper, 2000; Duderstadt, 2004; Kaplan,
2004). Kaplan (2004) has argued more extensive research needs to be conducted on lay
governance in higher education and “much that gets written about higher education rests
on anecdote or, at best a handful of case studies of governance at a small number of
institutions” (p. 167).
A Brief History of Baptist Higher Education Development among Southern Baptists
The history and development of Baptist higher education is only a small
component of the overall educational mosaic that evolved in America; however, it is one
that points to the early sectarian nature of higher educational institutions in the American
colonies (Thelin, 2004). While Harvard, Yale and William & Mary were created with the
underpinning of established denominational structures and congregational support, the
original tenets of Baptists ran counter to such control. Baptists are genetically encoded
with a “denominational DNA” (Hull, 2005) with markers for: (1) a predisposition to
dissent against the government, (2) an emphasis on the local autonomy of a congregation,
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(3) an exercising of the priesthood of the believer and (4) a general mistrust of centralized
authority. Therefore, the idea of investing power in a board of trustees was viewed with
great suspicion, but at the same time, completely logical, which creates a paradox. The
paradox was that Baptist churches had no problem with a strong Deaconate board to
oversee the administration of the local congregation; which was biblical in nature, but
viewed external control as early Baptists had experienced from the Church of England as
a tool of oppression and government control (McBeth, 1987).
However, in spite of any misgivings of consolidated power as exercised by a
board of trustees, by the time the College of Rhode Island, now Brown University, was
established in 1763, a board of trustees was the norm for governance and a legal
condition for receiving a charter for a college from the Crown of England (Thelin, 2004).
The College of Rhode Island embodied the nonsectarian tenets of early Baptists and
“stands as the major exception to the relative lack of religious tolerance and
accommodation within collegiate communities of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries” (p. 29). The reason for this ethos is evident in the fact that Baptists respected
and welcomed those of dissent and marginalized by society or sectarianism.
Though Brown University would serve as an important model and example in
early Baptist higher education, it would be the creation of the General Missionary
Convention of the Baptist Denomination in the United States for Foreign Missions on
May 18, 1814 that would ignite the vision for new colleges across the states and
particularly in the south. Educated men such as Luther Rice (graduate of Williams
College and Andover Seminary, Massachusetts), Adoniram Judson (graduate of Brown
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University), Francis Wayland (graduate of Union College, New York & later President of
Brown University), William Staughton (graduate of Bristol College, England), and
Richard Furman (graduate of Brown University) would be the Baptist leaders that would
provide energy to forge the vision and dream for an expansion of higher education among
Baptists. (McBeth,1987).
There was a conscious decision on the part of Baptists to separate undergraduate
colleges and graduate seminaries though the exact reason is not apparent. For this reason,
the Triennial Convention of Baptists of 1817 voted to approve the creation of Columbian
College in Washington, D.C., while graduate theological education would remain located
in Philadelphia. The rationale for locating the college in Washington D.C. was to
accommodate any suspicion of favoritism toward the northern or southern states. The
issue of sectionalism was already a growing concern in the Baptist movement.
A primary purpose of the new college was to educate prospective ministers for
Baptist work; however, the new college curriculum would also consist of studies for
medicine and law. “Classes began in the fall of 1821 and by 1826; the venture of higher
education by a national Baptist body had ended with only two graduating classes. The
college closed and the buildings were sold to the city of Washington D.C., which in turn
proceeded to charter and open George Washington University” (p. 356). The closing of
Columbian College by the national Baptist denomination would be considered a failure in
its first venture into higher education.
As Baptists migrated south, states grew in population, a distinctive cultural
identity emerged, and a wave of new Baptist colleges were founded from 1830-1850,
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generating significant state and “regional appeal and loyalty” (McBeth, 1987) that
allowed young men the opportunity to stay closer to home. The most notable of these
“pioneering colleges” (Johnson, 1955) that are still in existence are: Union University,
TN (1826), Furman University, S.C. (1826), Mississippi College, MS (1826), University
of Richmond, VA (1830), Georgetown College, KY (1830), Mercer University, GA
(1833), Samford University, AL (1841), Wake Forest University, NC (1843), and Baylor
University, TX (1845). Each of these pioneering institutions was founded by local
Baptist congregations or associations prior to an existence of any state Baptist
conventions (Johnson, 1955).
Following the Civil War numerous four-year and two-year colleges were
established in areas where Baptist mission work had increased or was being established
(Johnson, 1955). Each of these new Baptist colleges had lay boards with selfperpetuating membership. Though some of the state Baptist conventions provided
modest financial support, Baptist colleges would retain this independent and selfperpetuating governing board structure into the twentieth century. Churches and
individuals were encouraged to provide financial support for the colleges by the president
and members of the board. This open solicitation of funds is called the societal method
(Medders, 2000). Many, if not all, of the Baptist colleges and even Baptist seminaries
struggled to secure financial support during the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth
century.
In 1919, then Southern Baptist Convention (SBC) President J.B. Gambrell
proposed the first systematic fundraising campaign effort to secure $75 million over five
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years for Baptist missionary endeavors, $15 million of which would be dedicated to
higher education projects. (Johnson, 1955; Medders, 2000). This was a radical departure
for the SBC, whose previous fundraising endeavors had focused completely on
evangelism and missions.
Johnson (1955) indicates the SBC
....was now ready to participate in a co-operative movement to endow Baptist
colleges and to assist in financing sorely needed building programs. For the first
years of the campaign this proved delightfully successful since the amount
received in most of the states exceeded the goal set for the year. Before the end of
the five-year period, however, receipts had dwindled so drastically in each
succeeding year that a number of colleges which based their funding plans, their
debt-paying plan, and endowment income estimates upon receiving the full
amount of the anticipated funds, found themselves still in debt and not sufficiently
endowed. Building programs were then either discontinued or, if completed,
additional indebtedness was incurred. (p. 49-50).
“Although the campaign raised $58 million of the $92 million pledged and many
felt that the campaign was a failure, Baptists had raised more money than in any other
five-year period in its history” and “[t]his was the final piece that was needed to create a
comprehensive and systematic formula for ongoing philanthropy in the SBC” (Medders,
2000, p. 72-73.) In fact, this would be the first and only attempt to raise financial support
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for Baptist higher education throughout the entire SBC and would become the focus of
the state Baptist convention in which the institution was located.
Learning some important lessons from the previous five-year campaign in 1925
the SBC, along with each state convention, approved a new and radical model of
ecclesiastical philanthropy that would change the nature of financial support for colleges
and lay governance selections and elections by creating the Cooperative Program.
“Churches, associations, colleges, seminaries, state conventions, and national agencies
realized that working together they could accomplish far more than continuing the
societal method” (Medders, 2000). The rationale behind the Cooperative Program was
that churches, large and small, pooling their resources could feel they were making a
significant contribution to the work of the denomination regardless of the amount of
money they provided.
Three important points were negotiated among the respective conventions,
agencies, colleges and seminaries. First, the state Baptist convention would collect all the
Cooperative Program funds. A certain percentage of the funds would be guaranteed to
support the state convention and colleges. The remainder of the funds would be passed
on to the SBC and be distributed for international and national missions programs and
support of graduate theological education at the seminaries. Second, in order to
participate in the distribution formula, the agencies, colleges and seminaries had to agree
to have their trustees approved and/or elected by the state or national convention. Third,
under the old societal method agencies, colleges and seminaries could raise funds directly
from individuals and churches. Colleges receiving funds through the Cooperative
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Program were restricted direct solicitation from churches, while still allowing the
institutions to approach individuals for donations (Medders, 2000).
This new model of philanthropic support has over the past 80 years provided
hundreds of millions of dollars to support Baptist higher education institutions, funds that
would have otherwise never been received. In addition, this new funding mechanism
accelerated student and institutional growth given a secure source of funding. It is
important to note that following the approval of the Cooperative Program in 1925, all
state Baptist conventions, colleges and universities did not immediately or systematically
employ this new funding model. As Johnson (1955) points out, there was a gradual
integration of the funding model over the next two decades and “[b]y 1944, Baptist state
conventions were providing annual appropriations for the schools” (p. 426).
Within the Cooperative Program there was a clear delineation between the
funding, operations and governance between Baptist colleges and universities and the
SBC seminaries. While this separation had existed informally for decades, it would now
become formalized under the Cooperative Program model. From that time forward, state
Baptist conventions would provide funding and trustee election to any cooperating
college or university within the convention jurisdiction, and the SBC assumed
responsibility for funding and trustee election to the Baptist seminaries (Fletcher, 1994;
Leonard, 1990; Walker, 1993). The differentiation between nomination and election of
trustees at the state and national levels of Baptist polity was the origin of the governance
debate that would emerge at the forefront of Baptist life as described in the following
section.
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Emergence of Religious/Academic Conflict and Change in Baptist Governance
While 1979 was clearly the moment when fundamentalists and began to exert
power and gain control of the SBC and reshape the seminaries, ultimately attempting to
do the same in Baptist colleges and universities, it was not the first outcry against
theological liberalism in Southern Baptist history. As early as 1920, J. Frank Norris,
pastor of First Baptist Church, Fort Worth, TX leveled attacks of theological liberalism
against the faculty at Baylor University and the Southwestern Theological Seminary in
Dallas (Fletcher, 1994).
In 1963 George Elliott, a professor of Old Testament at the Midwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary, was selected to author a Genesis commentary as part of a new
Southern Baptist Bible commentary series. In the introduction to the commentary, Elliott
admitted utilizing a hermeneutical technique called historical-critical method as his
theoretical framework for interpreting Genesis. Historical-critical method was at that
time, and still today, a well-respected and utilized form of Biblical interpretation among
leading scholars around the world; however, within Baptist circles, it was considered an
inappropriate method for analyzing scripture, even if the resulting interpretation was
acceptable. His commentary was subsequently pulled from the series and written by
another author. Elliott was ultimately fired, not over his theological position, but for
insubordination in refusing to recant the historical-critical method as a heretical form of
interpretation of scripture (Fletcher, 1994; Leonard, 1994; McBeth, 1987 & Yarbrough,
2004).
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The new author of the Genesis commentary did not fare much better than Elliot.
In 1969, G. Henton Davies, an Old Testament scholar from Regent’s Park College,
Oxford, England, was “selected to write the commentary on Genesis because he was not
a Southern Baptist and because the Sunday School Board was sensitive to the criticism
surrounding Elliott’s book.” (Yarbough, 2004, p. 49). When the commentary was
published, in contrast to Elliott, Davies was not criticized for his methodology, but for his
interpretation of Genesis 22:1-9 which describes God asking Abraham to sacrifice his son
Isaac. He took the position that Abraham believed God indeed required him to sacrifice
Isaac and only because God intervened to prove a substitution was Isaac spared.
Because of the previous controversy with Elliott, the matter was brought to the
floor for the messengers (delegates) at the SBC Annual Meeting in 1971 to vote on
whether to accept the commentary. The convention turned down Davies’ commentary
and asked the Sunday School Board to find another author. Finally in 1972, the
Broadman Bible Commentary Genesis volume was published, with Clyde Francisco,
professor of Old Testament at the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, as the author
(Yarbrough, 2004).
These are some of the most public Baptist examples where fundamentalists and
ultra-conservatives denounced the pervasive influence of theologically liberal professors
and denominational leadership for allowing such publications to go forward under the
Baptist banner. As Fletcher (1994) indicates, in the late 1960s and early 1970s smaller
but public skirmishes took place between fundamentalists in Missouri and faculty at
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William Jewell College (MO), and accusations were leveled by some North Carolina
Baptists against the faculty at Wake Forest University.
Influential and affluent Baptists who were alumni and donors of the Baptist
colleges and universities were paying close attention to growing external pressure being
placed on faculty, particularly in the college and university religion departments. As
early as 1968, a prominent alumnus of the University of Richmond, in an effort to
improve the academic reputation of his alma mater, pledged $50 million to the university.
However, a precondition of the gift was that the president and board of trustees had to
change the charter to have four-fifths of the board self-perpetuating and the remaining
trustees selected by the Baptist General Convention of Virginia (BGCV). This would
insure that the politics and theology of the BGCV would not dictate or control the
direction of the university. Once the charter was modified, the donor executed the gift,
which at that time was the largest individual contribution to any higher education
institution in America. After that time, the ratio of trustees selected by the BGCV was
gradually reduced until 1999 when the University and BGCV severed all governance ties
(Yarbrough, 2004). The action taken by the board of trustees at the University of
Richmond in 1971 to reinstate a majority of the board as self-perpetuating was the first
Baptist institution to make this decision since the development of the Cooperative
Program.
Such theological debates were not limited to the SBC and Baptist state
conventions. Even the United Baptist Convention of Maine severed its governance and
funding relationship with Colby and Bates Colleges in 1933, because of the liberal
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teaching by members of the faculty (Tillman, 2004; Yarbrough, 2004). In 1944, under
the leadership of President Robert Hutchins, the University of Chicago changed its
charter to terminate governance control by the Northern Baptist Convention (NBC). In
the following year, after several decades of a tenuous relationship, Brown University also
ended its almost two-hundred year governance and financial relationship with the NBC
(Yarbrough, 2004).
In 1978, a group of fundamentalist Baptist ministers and laymen within the SBC
met to discuss issues concerning what they believed to be rampant theological liberalism
being taught by faculty in Baptist colleges, universities and seminaries (Fletcher, 1994,
Leonard, 1990; McBeth, 1987). For fundamentalists, it was simple; the Bible was the
inerrant and authoritative Word of God. If the Bible stated it, it was true without any
mixture of error (i.e., grammatically, historically, geographically or scientifically).
Anything that ran counter to such teaching was considered heresy, even if it was in an
academic setting whether a college, university or seminary. Utilizing source, form,
literary, narrative or other theoretical frameworks or methodologies for study of Biblical
text was viewed as human intrusion on God’s Word.
One of the architects and founding members of the new fundamentalist movement
was Paul Pressler, a Houston Appeals Court Judge who “claimed that his efforts to
reshape the SBC began in 1977 after he became aware of the theological liberalism
taught at Baylor University, the largest Southern Baptist-supported school in Texas.
When he discovered the ‘garbage’ perpetuated by Baylor religion professors, he began
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studying how the system could be retaken by ‘grassroots constituents’” (Leonard, 1994 p.
136).
As the group became more organized, they determined there was no immediate
way to impact the colleges and universities at the state convention level, so they turned
their attention to the SBC seminaries first. The group discovered an ingenious way to
totally alter the selection process for electing members to the seminary trustee boards.
Instead of trying to convince all of the churches and their members in each state that
theological liberalism had crept into the colleges, universities and seminaries, they
realized they only had to convince the messengers (less than 1% of Southern Baptists
across America) at the SBC Annual Meeting that this was destroying the very fabric of
the Baptist denomination (James, Leazer & Shoopman, 1999; Leonard, 1994).
This was important because the messengers (delegates), who represented
numerous, but not all, Southern Baptists were responsible for electing the president of the
SBC each year. The president, in turn, annually appointed individuals to serve on the
Committee on Committees, which made recommendations of individuals to be appointed
to the board of trustees for the seminaries. Within the SBC seminary trustee structure,
one-fourth of the trustee boards were either open for re-appointment or new selections
each year. It was determined that if a fundamentalist president could be elected for three
consecutive years, through the re-appointment or appointment process they could
ultimately reshape and control the board of trustees Once this transformation occurred,
the board could change the president and elect a more theologically conservative
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president who would appoint like-minded faculty
(http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/legal/constitution.asp).
As previously noted, the initial concerns of Judge Pressler were primarily with the
faculty of Baylor University, but controlling the state Baptist conventions would be more
difficult than starting with the SBC. Whereas some institutions and state Baptist
conventions follow the same process for appointment as the SBC, many of the colleges
and universities board of trustees nominated new potential trustees, the Committee on
Committees would then approve the nominations and the state convention ultimately
votes to elect the trustees at the state convention meeting. Influencing college and
university presidents and trustees to nominate more fundamentalist trustees would be a
more difficult task, making it challenging to initially create a systematic strategy for
takeover of the state Baptist colleges and universities. Some of these limitations created a
more protracted process with the state Baptist conventions as opposed to the direct SBC
presidential process. The national fundamentalist group felt once they gained momentum
and control of the SBC, fundamentalist within state Baptist conventions would eventually
support and implement a similar plan of takeover. The diagram below demonstrates how
the fundamentalists were able to take over the SBC and particularly the seminary’s
trustee selection from 1979 to 1986 (James, Leazer & Shoopman, 1999).
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SBC Convention Elects
(June)

President

State Convention Elects
(Generally November)

Appoints
Committee on Committees
Nominates
SBC Convention Elects
(June of next year)

Committee on Nominations

State Convention Elects
(November of next year)

Nominates
SBC Convention Elects
(June second year)

Board of Trustees

State Convention Elects
(November second year)

Appoints
Seminary/College/University President
Appoints
Seminary/College/University Faculty

Figure 2:1: Trustee election process in the SBC & Baptist state conventions
Until the mid-1980s, Baptist colleges and universities remained primarily
apolitical even though the fundamentalists had attacked many of the religion and science
faculty for their teaching. Also among the Baptist college and university presidents there
remained a common professional spirit and collegiality. They collectively promoted the
benefit of overall Baptists and the institutions they served. This was even true of those
presidents and board of trustees who were considered more theologically conservative.
However, once a fundamentalist ideology was adopted by trustees and presidents of the
seminaries, the presidents and board of trustees of the colleges and universities
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recognized the same scenarios could happen within their states. Presidents and trustee
boards began to examine their charters, by-laws, state convention agreements and
nonprofit laws in their state, as well as the fiscal well-being of the college or university,
to see what options were available (Falkner, 1993; Leonard, 1994; Taylor, 2000).
It is important to recognize that there are several criteria that determine the
relationships between a Baptist college or university and the state Baptist convention.
First, does the college or university have a charter that originally allowed for a selfperpetuating board of trustees that pre-existed the formation of the Baptist state
convention? Second, does the state Baptist convention own and operate the college or
university? Third, does non-profit corporation law within the state permit the Baptist
state convention to own and operate the college or university? Fourth, through non-profit
corporation law within a state, can the college or university trustees reconstitute the
original charter or establish a new charter creating a new self-perpetuating board of
trustees not elected by the Baptist state convention? And fifth, can the Baptist state
convention and the college or university renegotiate a relationship reflecting one or
several combinations as listed above? While the decision to strategically change the
governance structure of a Baptist college or university may be driven by political or
theological ideals of presidents, trustees and/or alumni, the final arbitrator determining
the success or failure of such a decision lies within state law because it is the state that
issues the charter.
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Bogue & Medders (2005) developed a three category taxonomy that describes the
lay governance relationships between Baptist colleges or universities and state Baptist
conventions.

Severance
Self
Determinative

Self
Provocative

Accommodation
Willing

Mandatory

Maintenance
Self
Self
Determinative Provocative

Willing

Figure 2:2: Baptist Colleges/Universities Governance Taxonomy

The first category describes those institutions that chose to sever “any governance
relationship between the institutions campus board of trustees and the state Baptist
convention” (p 7). Under the severance category there are two sub-categories:; selfdeterminative and self-provocative. Self-determinative is defined as an institution where
the trustees have the legal right in accordance with state law to change their charter and
reconstitute or create a self-perpetuating board and have taken action to do so. The selfdeterminative board of trustees make the decision to do everything in its power to protect
the historical mission of the institution they hold in trust.
Self-provocative is an institution that does not have the legal right to change the
charter and reconstitute a new board of trustees and only through mutual agreement
between the state convention and institution can the legal and governance agreement be
modified. However, that does not preclude the potential for legal action by either party to
attempt to sever legal and governance ties.
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Samford University would fit within the severing self-determinative sub-category.
Although Samford University, then Howard College, was chartered in 1841 by the
Alabama Baptist Convention (ABC), the institution was chartered with a selfperpetuating board of trustees (Sulzby, 1986). Therefore in September, 1994, when the
board of trustees announced that Samford University was severing governance ties with
the ABC, they met several of the important criteria mentioned earlier to make this
decision. First, the board of trustees was legally able to revert to the original charter
since it allowed for a self-perpetuating board. Second, while the ABC chartered the
institution, the convention did not own the university. Third, Alabama non-profit law
allowed the university board of trustees to change the governance structure of their
charter, since it had previously been altered in 1920 to allow the ABC authority to
nominate and elect members to the board of trustees and at the same time initiated the
process of receiving financial support from the ABC (Sulzby, 1986).
Mercer University would appear to fit into the self-provocative sub-category.
Founded by the Georgia Baptist Convention (GBC) in 1831 as the Mercer Institute, the
Mercer charter allowed that only individuals nominated by the institution could be
elected by the GBC. In other words, while the university did have a self-perpetuating
board of trustees, the GBC could not appoint anyone to the board without having the
university nominate them. Legally, the Mercer board of trustees could not change their
charter unilaterally, as the Samford trustees were able to do, since the Executive
Committee of the GBC had final authority over the institution (Dowell, 1958). At the
same time, the convention could not attempt to elect more conservative trustees without
37

the consent and approval of the university. Clearly, this type of charter arrangement gave
greater protection and leverage to the university from any type of overt take-over by the
GBC. Finally, in November 2006, the GBC and Mercer University agreed to end the
stalemate and sever the governance and financial ties.
A second category of relationship by Baptist colleges or universities is defined as
accommodation. Under this category there are two sub-categories; willing and mandatory
accommodation. Willing accommodation is defined as boards of trustees supporting the
theological agenda and composition of the state Baptist convention and, therefore,
allowing the convention to elect trustees in return for continued financial support.
Carson-Newman College (TN) would be an example of an institution that defines willing
accommodation. In 1998, the college reconstituted a self-perpetuating lay board, and the
Tennessee Baptist Convention (TBC) immediately froze financial support. Later in 2000
the college, while not reversing their charter change, did amend the by-laws to return
trustee election to the TBC. Because of this action by the college, the TBC released all
withheld funds and reinstated annual support.
Mandatory accommodation is defined as a college or university that is owned and
operated by the Baptist state convention and the institution has no legal recourse to sever
its operating or governance relationship. Shorter College (GA) is an example of
mandatory accommodation. In 2003, the board of trustees of Shorter College dissolved
the existing charter and reconstituted a new charter and lay governing board. The
Georgia Baptist Convention (GBC) sued the college and the case ultimately made its way
to the state Supreme Court in 2005 where the institution’s actions were ruled
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unconstitutional under the state’s non-profit law; thereby, returning trustee selection,
ownership and control to the GBC. This is an example of a state Baptist convention that
has the legal right to own and operate colleges or universities (Pierce, 2005).
The final category is the institution that is in maintenance. This definition means
the board of trustees could change the charter legally and modify the relationship with the
Baptist state convention; however, because the relationship is positive and nonthreatening, there is no need to take action. If necessary, action to change the charter
could be executed by the board of trustees at these institutions. A significant number of
Baptist colleges and universities remain in the maintenance category.
Campbellsville University (KY) would be an example of an institution in the
maintenance category. The university was founded in 1906 as the Russell Creek
Academy (RCA), by the Russell Creek Baptist Association (RCBA). As early as 1908,
the Academy found itself in financial difficulties and petitioned the Baptist Educational
Society of Kentucky, now the Kentucky Baptist Convention (KBC), to assume
governance and fiscal responsibility for the school (Badgett, 2006). While the election of
the trustees was given to the KBC in return for additional financial support, trustees could
only be elected by nomination of the RCBA. As the institution progressed from the RCA
to become Campbellsville Junior College in 1923, then moving to four-year status as
Campbellsville College in 1962 and becoming Campbellsville University in 1996, the
charter was changed in order to retain a relationship which allowed the trustees of the
university to make nominations to the KBC to elect new trustees (Badgett, 2006).
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As previously indicated, state non-profit corporation law determines much of the
legal relationship between the institutions and the state Baptist conventions. Three
aspects of non-profit corporation law afforded Campbellsville University the legal
opportunity to change its charter to create a self-perpetuating board of trustees if
necessary. First, the university has an original charter as RCA that allowed for a selfperpetuating board that pre-dated a relationship with the KBC, as was the case of
Samford University (Badgett, 2006).
Second, Kentucky non-profit corporation law allows incumbent trustees or
directors of institutions and organizations to change the charter with respect to
governance structures (Badgett, 2006). As Campbellsville University chairman of the
board and KBC legal counsel Henry Huff pointed out in a 1985 memorandum even
though the KBC elects the trustees nominated by the institution, “after those Trustees are
elected, they become the Trustees of the agency and/or institution, and are not subject to
removal by the Kentucky Baptist Convention without an agreement” (Appendix A Henry B. Huff, personal communication, May 9, 1985, p. 1). Furthermore, Huff
indicated that“[t]he trustees are not trustees to the K.B.C.” and “[t]he relationship is not
that of a structure in a corporation because the K.B.C. is not a structure in our institutions
(i.e. the colleges) and the trustees of an eleemosynary institution that have responsibilities
of a unique nature” (p. 2). Therefore, trustees of Campbellsville University have the right
to protect the nature of the educational enterprise they serve even through the
modification of the governance structure.
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Third, one non-profit institution cannot own or operate another non-profit
institution in Kentucky. The prohibition for such non-profit corporations engaging in
these kinds of relationships deals with issues of ascending and descending liability.
Huff’s 1985 memorandum also makes it clear that, “[c]haritable immunity is dead. It has
been dead in Kentucky for around thirty to thirty-five years … The law has developed its
relationships such as master/servant, principal/agent, partnership, parent/subsidiary
corporation, and joint enterprise. In this field, there is a great deal of for profit law and
almost no church law.” (Appendix B, p. 1).
While church law is limited in examples of litigation, Kentucky and other states
have successfully utilized the question of ascending and descending liability to prohibit
and rule against non-profit institutions engaged in such relationships. Huff identified two
legal grounds where ascending and descending liability could create legal difficulties for
either the KBC and/or the institutions. The first is the instrumentality rule where a
“parent corporation, as owner of subsidiaries is held liable for its actions” (Appendix B,
p. 3). And second, agency rule where a court determines the subsidiaries after being used
by the parent to accomplish the business of the parent corporation. However, because of
differences in non-profit corporation law from state to state, the Shorter College outcome
would be much different than in Kentucky. These same laws are not applicable under the
Georgia state non-profit statutes.
The vast majority of Huff’s memorandum became the actual report from the
Special Committee presented to the Executive Board on July 18, 1985 and subsequently
approved by the entire KBC at the annual meeting in November 1985. As legal counsel
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for the KBC, Huff was arguing for clear distance between the KBC and the institutions;
at a time when the SBC was exercising greater control of its seminaries and agencies. It
was Huff who brought to light the legal issues with respect to many state Baptist
conventions and the institutions.
However, the fact that the denominational ties have always been held together by
fragile organizational ties should not have been a surprise to anyone, especially in
Kentucky. “The relationship between the KBC and the affiliated colleges may be
described as ‘loose’. Such was the conclusion of four professional educators, who in
1929 were employed by the General Association of Kentucky Baptist to conduct ‘A
Survey of Nine Educational Institutions of Kentucky’. Their finding was based on the
fact that the General Association had little to no control or influence over the institutions
except by the granting or withholding of its financial support” (Atkins, 1984, p. 37-38).
Recognizing that there was no legal recourse by which the KBC could unseat
existing trustees or elect trustees not nominated by the institutions, in 1986 the KBC
entered a mutually beneficial Covenant Agreement with each institution. The agreement
affirmed the nomination and election process of trustees, continued financial support
through the Cooperative Program, afforded additional opportunities for fundraising
beyond the Cooperative Program and for the first time provided an “Independence”
clause for the institutions. Campbellsville University’s statement read this way:
Should the Kentucky Baptist Convention for any reason fail to appropriate funds
in accordance with its previous level of contribution to Campbellsville College,
and this discontinuation of funding not be acceptable to Campbellsville College,
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then in that instance, Campbellsville College Trustees will no longer be elected by
the Kentucky Baptist Convention, after proper notice by the Campbellsville
College Trustees to the Kentucky Baptist Convention as set out in the covenant
term here in above (The Kentucky Baptist…, p. 9-10)

Once other colleges and universities began to examine the legal structures of their
relationships with their state convention, it would be less than a year before institutions
that could, began severing relationships with their conventions. While the KBC and
Kentucky Baptist colleges and universities would be the first to examine the legal
relationship between the institution and the convention, primarily because of the legal
expertise of Henry Huff, it would be twenty years (in 2005) before one of the institutions,
Georgetown College, would implement the “Independence” clause of the Covenant
Agreement and begin the process of severing ties with the KBC.
In this case, the KBC had not reduced the Cooperative Program support to the
college and even in some years the support had increased; however, the overall percent
impact of the funds became less as the budget increased. In addition, while the trustees
made recommendations to the KBC Committee on Nominations (Refer to Figure 2:1), the
Committee was beginning to question some nominee’s and the churches’ relationship to
the KBC. Instead of automatically getting the trustees elected you requested, the college
would be forced to submit multiple names that might be acceptable to the KBC based on
a growing list of criteria.
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At times in the early 2000s, some trustee nominations were scrutinized by the
Committee on Nominees and the colleges were asked to consider another nomination.
These types of increased situations concerning trustee nominations, along with the
diminishing impact of the Cooperative Program funds, led the trustees to change the
governance structure to a self-perpetuating Board. At this time, Campbellsville
University has made those same conclusions and therefore remains in the maintenance
category.
The maintenance institutions continue to monitor the relationship with the Baptist
state convention to determine if there is any threat of intrusion of the current lay
governance structure. Another factor that causes an institution to remain in the
maintenance category is that the institution has determined the loss of funding would
have its greatest impact on the current Baptist students and hope to maintain an open
relationship as long as possible. Institutions in this category would rather make a
strategic change in governance as a course of last resort, allowing the state convention to
initiate terminating the relationship or make the decision due to an overt threat.

Baptist Higher Education Research on Colleges and Universities Severing Governance
Relationships with the State Convention
At the time of this study two qualitative studies (Falkner, 1993; Taylor 2000)
constitute the existing research on the phenomenon and impact of Baptist colleges and
universities severing ties with their state conventions. While both examine different
aspects of the phenomenon, each uses the severing or threat of severing governance ties
as the foundational aspect of the research. The study conducted by Falkner (1993) on
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Baylor University had two purposes. First, Falkner (1993) wanted to “provide a
descriptive historical record of the elements and reasons involved in Baylor’s decision”
and second, “ascertain and isolate elements which might be significant to higher
education now and in the future” (p. 19). The research methodology for this study was a
case study that examined issues related to Baylor University severing ties with the BGCT
in 1990. Twenty-two interviews were conducted with trustees, administrators, faculty
and alumni from Baylor University, leadership and representatives of the BGCT, and
ministers and laypersons from Baptist churches in Texas.
Falkner asked each participant a series of structured questions concerning their
thoughts on the: (1) role of Christian higher education, (2) role of governance in Christian
higher education, (3) role of institutional mission in Christian higher education, (4)
understanding and view of Baylor’s governance change, (5) understanding and view of
the SBC controversy, (6) impression of the future of Baylor, and (7) impression of the
future for SBC higher education (Falkner, 1993). As Falkner determined, even having an
adequate knowledge and historical context of the SBC, Baptist state conventions and
Baptist higher education, “[a]n issue as complex and dynamic as Baylor’s governance
change cannot be sufficiently examined or understood by restricting the inquiry merely to
venues of history and literature” (p. 141).
In terms of the role of Christian higher education, Falkner (1993) discovered the
participants, though all Baptist and historically tied to Baylor as an alumnus, trustee or
Texas Baptist, each had a wide range of opinions on students having a soteriological
experience to a world-class education. Falkner (1993) summarized the participant’s
45

responses this way, “[i]n regards to the number one priority of Christian higher
education, the lines of religious orthodoxy/evangelistic fervor and educational excellence
seemed to be a blur somewhat” (p. 69).
According to Falkner (1993), those interviewed expressed less ambiguity
concerning the role of governance in Christian higher education, understanding that
trustees provide direction, set goals and objectives and provide fiduciary leadership for
the institution. However, how the trustees are selected and to whom they are held
responsible to was another matter. As Paul Pressler, former Baylor trustee, attorney,
judge, key lay leader in the conservative SBC movement and against Baylor’s decision to
sever governance ties with the BGCT stated in his comment on governance; “I believe if
a denomination creates or owns or elects the Trustees of an institution or finances that
institution, that institution should be responsive to the denomination that so does. And
that the Trustees hold their positions in trust for the denomination that elects them.” (p.
71). Disagreement on accountability of Baylor trustees to the denomination was quite
naturally questioned by those who were opposed to the university severing ties with the
BGCT.
The question related to the role of institutional mission in Christian higher
education also elicited strong and diverse opinions from the participants, again primarily
divided between those in favor and those opposed to Baylor’s decision. As Falkner
indicates, “[s]ome assumed that the mission would become apparent as a natural
course…while others insisted that the mission be rigorously displayed and constantly
before the entire institution” (p. 84). Fundamentalists who opposed Baylor’s decision
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expressed the opinion that unless the mission was overt, a Christian institution was no
different from non-sectarian private or state institutions. However, within the Baylor
community, the severing of governance ties with the BGCT did not alter the historic
mission or purpose of the institution in that the university had existed over 40 years prior
to the creation of the BGCT in 1886. In fact, administration, faculty, trustees and alumni
were catalysts in the formation of the BGCT and Baylor was even the early home of the
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (Falkner, 1993; McBeth, 1987).
Falkner’s (1993) question regarding the participants’ understanding and view of
Baylor’s governance change and the SBC controversy revealed significant information
concerning the phenomenon. First, former president, Judge Abner McCall indicated that
as early as 1955, there was consideration of changing the charter due to ongoing
theological attacks, questions of institutional ownership, and the inability to take federal
financial aid, which at the time was not allowed in any Baptist institution (Hester, 1968).
Second, the president at the time of the decision, Herbert Reynolds, specified that
the two events that framed the final decision for the governance change was the 1988
BGCT annual meeting and the 1990 SBC annual meeting. As Reynolds stated in his
interview,
’In June of 1990, we went to New Orleans (site of the 1990 SBC annual meeting).
In our minds eye it was all over. The victory had been consolidated…I came back
here and felt it was time to get it [the charter change research] out of the safe. The
convention had fallen and the state convention was going to be next. Texas
would be at the top of the list.’(p. 87).
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Third, between 1988 and 1990, the president had directed a team of attorneys to
determine if the charter could be changed, how the process would take place and if it
would be defensible in court if the BGCT took legal actions against the institution.
Reynolds pointed out that over the two year period they became convinced “conclusively
that the only body that could change the charter and do so where it would hold up was
our own Board of Directors. The convention (BGCT) couldn’t do it; we couldn’t do it in
the administration” (p. 86-87).
Finally, once the decision was made administratively that it was time for the
institution to take action, the entire board had to be informed of the plan and determine
“[t]he most critical question of all, ultimately,… would the Board take action” (p. 88)?
What Falkner (1993) discovered was that though the board of trustees ultimately made
the final decision in 1990, the president had been the key architect in the formulation and
implementation of the governance change at Baylor.
In terms of questions related to the future of Baylor University and implication for
higher education in general, Falkner’s (1993) research concluded that generally those
who supported Baylor’s decision believed the institution had a bright future not only in
terms of academic credibility, but also in relationship to Texas Baptist as well as Baptist
nationally. However, others like Joel Gregory, who at the time of the decision was Pastor
of First Baptist Church Dallas, “expressed his profound hurt at its loss to Texas Baptist
and his personal loss as an alumnus” (p. 119). Falkner (1993) goes on to conclude that
the
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future for other Baptist institutions are uncertain and [a]s changes in the SBC
continue to affect state conventions and, correspondingly, the Baptist schools of
those states, greater stress may be placed on some Baptist schools to investigate
alternatives to current governance approaches (p. 159).
Falkner’s (1993) research provides unique insight in the internal decision-making
process of the governance change at Baylor University and the reactions by the BGCT
and other Texas Baptists. To date, this research provides the most comprehensive study
on governance change among Baptist higher education institutions. The research
concluded that the internal decision made by the administration and trustees to change the
charter and governance relationship with the BGCT was precipitated by the theological
shift and takeover of the SBC toward a more theologically fundamentalist position and
the potential threat that Baylor would become the primary target once the movement
developed in the BGCT.
As previously stated, one of the more important findings of the research was the
significant influence the president had in the design and implementation process of the
decision and his ability to work closely with and convince the board of trustees this was
the best direction for the institution. Because the research was conducted only three
years following Baylor’s decision, the emotions of the individuals involved on both sides
of the issue were still passionate in nature and none of the participants had wavered from
their initial inclination toward the decision.
The purpose of Taylor’s (2000) study was to examine if Furman University and
Mercer University had exhibited characteristics of secularization and reflected their
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historic Baptist identity while at the same time distancing themselves from their state
Baptist conventions. At the time of the study, only Furman University had severed
governance and financial ties with the South Carolina Baptist Convention, while Mercer
University was experiencing a strained relationship with the Georgia Baptist Convention.
The methodology for the research was a qualitative case study in which the author
interviewed a total of 91 participants from the two campuses, “including 32
administrators, 23 faculty members and 36 students” (p. 48). No trustees or
denominational representatives were interviewed as part of the process at either
institution. The research was guided by the “organizational culture perspective” as the
conceptual framework which serves “as a means of describing and understanding the
distinctive aspects of the life on a particular college’s campus” (p. 9). Taylor (2000)
wanted to know how the decision by Furman University to sever governance and
financial ties with the South Carolina Baptist Convention (SCBC) and the current
relationship between Mercer University and the GBC affected the Baptist identity of the
universities, financial support, admissions criteria, curriculum, campus religion, student
behavior standard and the overall campus environment.
Taylor (2000) concluded that Furman had experienced the highest level of
secularization since severing their governance ties. With governance and financial ties
severed between Furman and the convention, the emphasis on the Baptist history and
heritage began to diminish and was replaced with a desire to be viewed as an elite private
liberal arts institution among a different set of peer institutions. In addition, the study
concluded that the “curriculums in general and the religious requirements in particular
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were unaffected by the denominational rumblings” (p. 356). The study further showed
that student admissions and faculty denominational affiliations and involvement patterns
were not immediately affected by the governance shift. In fact, at both institutions at the
time of the study, “[t]he number of Mercer freshman citing the university’s religious
affiliation as very important in their decision to attend more than doubled during the
1990s, and ironically, that percentage actually increased at Furman despite the severance
of denominational ties in 1992” (p. 360).
What is significant about this research is it identified the external factors of the
Baptist state convention and their attempt to take over the lay governing boards as the
rationale for (1) the Furman University trustee board making the decision to sever
governance ties with the SCBC, and (2) the trustees at Mercer University contemplating
making the same decision with the GBC. In the case of Furman University, Taylor
(2000) points out, during the 1970s and 1980s, “Furman’s administration and trustees
observed with great concern what they viewed as a fundamentalist takeover of the
Southern Baptist Convention and its denominational boards and seminaries” (p. 62). As
had happened at the SBC level and feared by many in state conventions, by the mid1980s, fundamentalists in the “SCBC gained control of the nominating committee and
began putting their own people on Furman’s board” and “gained 3 out of 5 new places on
the Furman board of trustees” (p. 63).
Recognizing that within a short period of time the SCBC would gain complete
control over the Furman University board of trustees, “a group of Furman graduates
decided to take steps to protect their alma mater from becoming a ‘political football’”(p.
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66). After conducting their research, these alumni discovered that under South Carolina
non-profit law, the trustees had the legal right to amend the existing charter and by-laws
to return to a self-perpetuating board. In 1956, the college changed its charter and
allowed the SCBC to elect the Furman trustees in return for increased financial support.
However, in 1990 the financial support was considered only a small percentage of the
overall university budget but the SCBC retained 100% control over the trustee election
process, even as the support had gradually decreased (Taylor, 2000). When the trustees
realized the SCBC had little, if any, legal recourse against the institution for severing the
governance relationship, in October 1990 the decision was made to change the charter
and re-establish a self-perpetuating board. After several threats of litigation by the SCBC
and unsuccessful compromise proposals by both sides, in 1992 the SCBC decided to
sever all legal and financial ties with the university. (James, Leazer & Shoopman; 1999;
Leonard, 1994; & Taylor, 2000).
Mercer University also became very concerned about the political influence of the
SBC on the GBC. “Although the president indicated in 1989 that the political
fundamentalist had made its way in the state conventions, Georgia moderates did control
the GBC presidency in 1990 and 1991. ‘We never won after that,’ lamented a member of
the president’s staff. The president announced to the university trustees in 1992 that the
‘fundamentalist takeover’ of the SBC was complete.” (Taylor, 2000, p. 201-202).
However, as has previously been identified, Mercer University had a unique governance
relationship with the GBC. According to the Mercer University charter, the GBC could
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only elect board members nominated by the current trustees (Bogue & Medders, 2006;
Dowell, 1958; Taylor, 2000).
As early as 1989, the GBC had made several requests of Mercer University to
have a “greater voice in selecting trustees” (p. 197). However, the university board never
relinquished this authority even though in 1997 the three other Baptist higher education
institutions in the state acquiesced to these demands solidifying the GBC control of the
trustee selection process. While it would be another nine years before Mercer University
and the GBC would sever governance and financial ties, Taylor (2000) indicated that
following the 1997 GBC convention meeting, the “president acknowledged in 1998 the
uncertain future of the relationship given the constant threat that the convention will
make demands that impinge on the inviolate issues” (p, 211).
The significance of Taylor’s (2000) research is that it confirms Falkner’s (1993)
findings in identifying the precipitating factor of the theological shift and takeover of the
SBC as the cause for the deteriorating relationship with the Baptist state conventions and
these two universities. However, in the case of Furman University, Taylor (2000) only
examined the phenomenon from the campus perspective (i.e. administration, faculty and
staff) and does not include interviews with trustees or Baptist convention staff or
representatives in the study. While it is clear from the research that the presidents at both
institutions had tremendous influence on the governing boards, since the trustees make
the final decision regarding issues related to the charter it would be critical to know what
factors influenced their decision to sever or retain relationships with the state
conventions.
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In addition, Taylor (2000) examined two institutions at different phases in their
relationship with their Baptist state convention. Furman University had severed ties with
the SCBC and Mercer University, though strained, still maintained governance and
financial ties with the GBC. Therefore, it might be difficult to draw comparable
conclusions or generalizable outcomes from either or both institutions. However, Taylor
(2000) did emphasize the need for further research on other Baptist institutions that either
had or would in the future sever governance and financial ties with the State Baptist
convention and understand the factors that influenced the trustees’ decision and how the
decision would impact the future of both entities.
In terms of future research on the phenomenon of governance change at Baptist
higher education institutions, Falkner (1993) indicated that comparative case studies
would be extremely beneficial to expanding the body of research. In addition, while 17
Baptist higher education institutions have severed governance ties with their respective
state conventions, the Falkner (1993) and Taylor (2000) studies demonstrate the limited
research that has been conducted to date on this phenomenon.

Summary
The review of the literature examined the origin and uniqueness of higher
education governance, the development of lay governance in America, the emergence of
Baptist higher education, the history and development of lay governance in Baptist
colleges and universities, and how state Baptist conventions related to the governance of
the colleges and universities. The chapter concluded with a review of the current
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literature that examined the phenomenon of Baptist colleges and universities which have
severed governance relationships with their respective state Baptist convention and the
factors that influenced the decision. What this chapter further revealed was the limited
research conducted on the factors that led Baptist colleges and universities to sever
governance ties with their Baptist state conventions (Falkner, 1993; Taylor, 2000).
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology

The purpose of this study was (1) to describe the factors that influenced the board
of trustees at Mississippi College and Georgetown College, KY to sever governance ties
with their respective state Baptist Conventions and (2) to describe the impact of the
decision on the college administration, academic operations, the lay governance structure
and denominational relationship on the two institutions. The research questions guiding
this study were:
1. What were the factors that influenced the decision-making process to make a
change in governance relationship between the institution and the state Baptist
Convention?
2. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the college administrative and academic
operations, lay governance structure and denominational relationships?

Addressed in this chapter is the research design, research institutions and
populations, data sources, procedures for data acquisition and the data analysis utilized in
the study. The final section of this chapter will address the trustworthiness, reliability
and validity of the study.

Research Design
A qualitative research design method was chosen for this study to describe and
explore the specific phenomenon of private Baptist higher education institutions severing
governance ties with their sponsoring religious organizations. More specifically, the
purpose of the study was to determine the specific factors, if any, influenced the decision
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of lay-governing boards at two private Baptist higher education institutions to sever the
governing relationship with their respective Baptist state conventions. McMillian and
Schumacher (2006) suggest that qualitative research methods should be used when
“researchers collect data in face to face situations by interacting with selected persons in
their setting” (p. 315). For the purpose of this study according to Patton (1990), “[t]he
point of using qualitative methods is to understand naturally occurring phenomenon in
their naturally occurring state” (p. 41). As in the case of this study, Creswell (2005)
indicates that “[t]he literature might yield little information about the phenomenon of the
study and you need to learn more from participants through exploration” (p. 45).
Though several qualitative research methods were available to utilize for this
study, the most appropriate was case study design which is defined by Creswell (2005) as
“an in-depth exploration of a bounded system (e.g., an activity, event, process or
individuals) based on extensive data collection” (p. 439). This study fits the model of a
bounded system in that it is a case “separated out for research in terms of time, place, or
some physical boundaries” (p. 439).
According to Yin (2003) case study design is best utilized when there is “an
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident” (p. 13). Merriam (2002) further indicates that a case study is an appropriate
method when the researcher wants to provide “intensive description and analysis of a
phenomenon or social unit such as an individual, group, institution, or community” (p. 8).
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Since two institutions were part of this study, the “multiple-case” (Yin, 2003) or
“collective case study” (Creswell, 2005) design was utilized. The advantage of a
“multiple-case” (Yin, 2003) approach is that it “is often considered more compelling, and
the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (p. 46). For this “multiplecase” (Yin, 2003) design study, each institution “was carefully selected so that it either
(a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication),” (p. 47). Yin (2003) further concludes that
“[a]n important step in all of these replications is the development of a rich theoretical
framework” (p. 47). For this study, the phenomenon (Creswell, 2005; Merriam, 2002;
McMillian & Schumacher, 2006 & Patton, 1995) was two Baptist higher education
institutions severing governance ties with their Baptist state conventions using the
political frame theoretical framework (Bolman & Deal, 2003).

Research Sites and Populations
The process of “purposeful sampling” was used by the researcher to “intentionally
select individuals and sites to understand the central phenomenon” (Creswell, 2005, p.
204). Therefore, two private Baptist higher education institutions that have severed
governance ties with their Baptist state conventions and individuals with knowledge of
the phenomenon were identified and selected from the sample of 17 institutions for the
study. These two institutions were chosen for reasons; (1) their willingness to participate
in the study and one institution, Mississippi College was able to work out a new
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relationship with the MBC and the other, Georgetown College decided to sever the
relationship the relationship with the KBC.

Research Sites
The first institution selected was Mississippi College. Mississippi College is
located in Clinton, MS and was chartered by the state legislature with a self-perpetuating
board of trustees in January, 1826 as Hampstead Academy. It is the oldest higher
education institution in the state (Johnson, 1955; Martin, 2007). The charter was
modified in 1850 to allow the Mississippi Baptist Convention to nominate and elect all
trustees to the lay governing board. In 1994, trustees of the college changed the charter
to reestablish a self-perpetuating governing board. The current enrollment at Mississippi
College is approximately 5,200 students with over 3,200 undergraduates and the
remainder graduate students. The undergraduate programs are based on a liberal arts
curriculum with 80 majors and minors. Master’s and doctoral programs are offered in
Education, Science, Business, Law, Nursing and Pharmacy. The institution operates an
annual budget of over $85 million and an endowment that exceeds $55 million.
The second institution selected for the study was Georgetown College. Located
in Georgetown, KY, the college was chartered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky in
1829 as the Kentucky Baptist Education Society with a self-perpetuating governing board
(Johnson, 1955; Snyder, 1979). In 1941, the college modified its charter to allow the
KBC to elect the trustees in exchange for annual financial contributions. The college’s
board of trustees changed the charter in 2006 to reinstitute the self-perpetuating
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governing board. Currently, Georgetown College enrolls over 1,800 students with
approximately 1,200 of those being undergraduates. There are over 70 majors and
minors in the undergraduate program which is based on a liberal arts curriculum. The
only graduate program of the college is primary and secondary education. The institution
has a $30 million budget and an endowment of almost $25 million.

Research Population
The individuals and groups selected as the population for this study were selected
for their likely ability to provide in-depth information about the severing governance of
ties with their Baptist state convention. Searching for a variation of “information-rich”
(McMillian & Schumacher, 2006, p. 319) participants that could provide multiple
perspectives of the phenomenon was critical.
The “maximal variation sampling” (Creswell, 2005) categories utilized for this
study were: (1) college presidents, (2) trustees, (3) faculty, and (4) executive directors of
the Baptist state conventions. Three additional trustee and faculty subsets categories
were developed “that display different dimensions of the characteristic” (p. 204). The
subset categories were: (1) within-decision, (2) throughout-decision, and (3) postdecision. The subset categories are defined by the following: (1) within-decision individuals were trustees or faculty member when the governance change was made but
no longer serve in that role, (2) throughout-decision - individuals were trustees or faculty
member when the governance change was made and currently remain in that role, and (3)
post-decision - individuals who have joined the board of trustees or faculty since the
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change in governance was made. See tables below for the categories of participants from
Mississippi College and Georgetown College.
Table 3.1: Mississippi College and Mississippi Baptist Convention Interview
Participants

Mississippi College

Interview Participant Position

Administration

Current President
Former President
(4) Within the Decision
(2) Throughout the Decision
(5) Post Decision
(2) Within the Decision
(2) Throughout the Decision
(2) Post Decision

Board of Trustees

Faculty

Mississippi Baptist Convention
Administration

Current Executive Director
Former Executive Director

Table 3-2: Georgetown College and Kentucky Baptist Convention Interview
Participants
Georgetown College

Interview Participant Position

Administration

Current President
Provost
(4) Within the Decision
(4) Throughout the Decision
(4) Post Decision
(2) Within the Decision
(2) Throughout the Decision
(2) Post Decision

Board of Trustees

Faculty

Kentucky Baptist Convention
Administration
Lay Person

Current Executive Director
Chairperson KBC Workgroup
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The process of “snowballing”, “chaining” or “network sampling” (Creswell,
2005; McMillian & Schumacher, 2006 & Merriam, 2002) was also utilized by the
researcher by asking each participant to identify individuals that might provide additional
information to the study. This technique was intended to insure that all pertinent voices
to the phenomenon will be heard (Creswell, 2005; McMillian & Schumacher, 2006). The
results of this process led to four additional interviews; a lay-person that chaired a work
group for the KBC that negotiated the terms of dissolving the governance ties with
Georgetown College, the internal legal counsel for Georgetown College, the external
legal counsel for Georgetown College and the legal counsel for Mississippi College.

Sources of Data
“Most qualitative research depends on the use of multi-method strategies to
collect data.” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006, p. 340). According to Yin (2003), there
are six possible sources of data collected in case study research: documentation, archival
records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation and physical artifacts. Of
the six possible sources of data, interviews, direct observation and documentation were
employed as the sources of data for this study.

Interviews
As Seidman (2006) indicates, “[t]he primary way a researcher can investigate an
educational organization, institution or process is through the experience of the individual
people, the ‘others’ who make up the organization or carry out the process” (p. 10). In
addition, Yin (2003) indicates that, “[o]ne of the most important sources of case study
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information is the interview” (p. 89). Patton (1990) states, “[t]he major way in which
qualitative researchers seek to understand the perceptions, feelings, and knowledge of
people is through in-depth, intensive interviewing” (p. 25).
According to Creswell (2005), the in-depth interview process has several
advantages and disadvantages. Interviews; (1) “provide useful information when you
cannot directly observe participants” and (2) “they permit participants to describe
detailed personal information” (p. 215). Interviews also have disadvantages: (1)
“interviews only provide information ‘filtered’ through the interviewer”, (2) “interview
data may be deceptive and provide the perspective the interviewee wants the researcher
to hear”, (3) “the presence of the researcher may affect how the interviewee responds”,
and (4) “interviewee responses also may not be articulate, perceptive or clear” (p. 215).
Interviews are still the best source to “provide access to the context of people’s behavior
and thereby provides a way for researchers to understand the meaning of that behavior”
and how “their experiences affects the way they carry out that experience” (Seidman,
2003, p. 10).
The interview format followed for this study was the in-depth, one-on-one, faceto-face interactive approach (Creswell, 2005; McMillan & Schumacher, 2006; Patton,
1990 & Yin 2003;). Each one-on-one interview lasted approximately 45 to 60 minutes.
Only one participant of the 46 would not agree to a face-to-face interview, therefore the
interview had to be conducted via telephone. In order to allow the participants to “best
voice their experiences unconstrained” (Creswell, 2005, p. 214), the researcher utilized
the following interview techniques suggested by Seidman (2003):
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The researcher should listen more, talk less;
The researcher should follow up on what the participant says;
o Ask questions when you do not understand,
o Ask to hear more about the subject,
o Explore, don’t probe,
The researcher should not only listen more, talk less, but ask real
questions;
o Avoid leading questions,
o Ask open-ended questions,
The researcher should follow up; but don’t interrupt the participant.
The questionnaire used for the interviews consisted of four questions:
1. What were the factors that led the trustees of the institution to sever
governance ties with the Baptist state convention?
2. What was the role of the president and trustees in the decision-making process
to sever governance ties with the Baptist state convention?
3. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the college lay governance structure and
denominational relationships?
4. Is there additional information or issues of the college severing governance
ties with the Baptist state convention that have not been discussed?
A “standardized open-ended interview” (McMillian & Schumacher, 2006, p. 351)
protocol using the questions cited above was employed in this study. Using open-ended
questions allowed “the participants to create the option for responding” (Creswell, 2005,
p. 215). The interviewer asked the participants “the same question in the same order”
(McMillian & Schumacher, 2006, p. 351), “allowing the participants to take (the question
in any) he or she wants” (Yin, 2003, p. 84).
In addition, McMillian and Schumacher (2006) indicate that “qualitative
interviews are verbatim accounts of what transpires in the interview session” (p. 355).
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Therefore, to ensure a verbatim transcript and aid in the data analysis process, each
interview was audio recorded with the consent of the participants. In case the first
recording device failed or malfunctioned, a second recorder was used in each interview,
except for the single telephone interview. Not only did the audio recorded interviews
provide a verbatim transcript from each participant, it also provided additional “material
for reliability checks” (McMillian & Schumacher, 2006, p. 355). Of the 46 participants
in the study, only one would not allow the interview to be recorded.

Field Notes
Field notes were taken by the interviewer during each participant interview and
were the only source of data for one participant. In the field notes, the interviewer made
notation of “the setting that was observed, the activities that took place in that setting, the
people who participated in those activities and the meaning of what was observed from
the perspective of the observer” (Patton 1990, p. 202). Creswell (2005) points out three
reasons for taking field notes during the interview process (1) they serve as a backup in
case of a recording malfunction, (2) they serve as a prompt to stay on task with the
interview protocol, and (3) they can be analyzed immediately without having to be
transcribed. The field notes taken during this study described the setting of the
interviews, reactions by the participants to the questions, and relevant information from
the participants to the questions.
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Documents
The collection of documents and artifacts is the only aspect of the qualitative
research design where there is “little or no reciprocity between the researcher and the
participant” (McMillan & Schumacher, 2006). While some of the participants may have
access to a limited amount of the documents used in the study, they do not have the
benefit of having access to all prior to the interview. Creswell (2005) identifies six
procedures to utilize when considering the collection process:
Identify documents that can answer the research question;
Locate public and private documents related to the research (i.e.
newspaper, newsletters, periodicals, press releases and magazines);
Once documents are located, seek permission to use, if necessary;
Request permission to use personal journals or documents if discovered;
Examine all public and private documents for accuracy prior to use;
Record information from documents from which copies cannot be
acquired.
Some of the documents were collected through internet websites sources. These
websites contained news articles from media outlets and information and documents
posted on the institutions’ websites concerning the changing of the college charter. The
information gathered from these various collections of data was reviewed prior to the
interviews and provided a “behind-the-scenes look” not normally “directly observable
and about which the interviewer might not ask appropriate questions without the leads
provided through the documents” (Patton, 1990, p. 245).
Each institution provided minutes from the board of trustee meetings related to
the issue of the changing of the institution’s charter. In addition, both institutions
provided copies of the previous and current charters. Yin (2003) contends that
66

information collected through these sources aids the researcher to; (1) “verify the correct
spelling and titles or names of organizations that might have been mentioned in
interviews”, (2) “corroborate and augment evidence from other sources”, and (3) be able
to “make inference from documents” (p. 87). Other external documents were reviewed
such as state Baptist papers and local and state newspapers, and institutional press
releases. These documents were used to create a “convergence of evidence” (Yin, 2003,
p. 100). Relevant archival data is also included and listed in the appendix of the
dissertation.

Data Collection Procedures
The University of Tennessee (UTK) Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved
this study before the data collection process was initiated. Following the IRB
Information Consent Form (Appendix C) was distributed by mail or e-mail for the
participants to sign prior to conducting the interviews.
Participation by the institutions and individuals was completely voluntary and
remained so through the entire study. Participants were informed that while they would
be identified as participating in the study, their comments and quotes would remain
anonymous and would not be attributed to them unless requested and with their
permission. Also, participants were informed that all data would be kept in a locked
cabinet in Roger’s Hall, Room 301 on the campus of the University of North Alabama.
Only the interviewer had access to this cabinet.
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Once the institutions were identified and selected, the researcher made initial
telephone contact with the presidents of both institutions to determine if the presidents
and institution would be willing to participate in the study. During this conversation, the
researcher explained the purpose and rationale for this study and the methodology that
would be used in conducting the study. It was indicated during the conversation with the
presidents that the researcher wanted to have the perspective of the state Baptist
convention’s executive director and requested permission from the president to contact
the executive director to request their participation in the study.

Neither president

objected to the state Baptist convention executive director participating, if they were
willing to do so. Upon their agreeing verbally to participate, formal letters (Appendix D)
were sent to verify the president’s final decision.
In the case of Mississippi College, the researcher also requested approval to
contact the former president of the college and former executive director of the Baptist
convention to determine if they were willing to participate in the study, since both were
in their positions at the time the charter change occurred but had since retired. The
president agreed to this request.
During the telephone conversations with the current presidents as well as in
follow-up correspondence, the presidents were also asked to submit recommendations of
trustees and faculty by e-mail or letter that would best assist in exploring the trustees’
decision at their campus. The presidents supplied a list of potential trustee and faculty
participants for each of the subset categories to: (1) within-decision, (2) throughoutdecision, and (3) post-decision. While the presidents participated in the study, it was
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determined that the “maximal variation sampling” (Creswell, 2005) would be 12 trustees
and six faculty members; four trustees and two faculty members representing each subset
category.
Following receipt of the trustee and faculty recommendations from the presidents,
prospective participants were contacted by telephone to inform them that they had been
recommended by the institution to participate, informed the individuals of the nature and
purpose of the study and requested their participation. The initial conversation with the
prospective participants served two important purposes; (1) build rapport and (2) inform
the participant of the potential benefit of the research to the field of study and the
historical record for the institution (Seidman, 2003). Several prospective participants
denied the request to participate.
Those individuals that agreed to participate received a formal communication in
either letter or e-mail form to confirm their willingness to participate. A second
telephone conversation was made to schedule interviews. A follow up e-mail was sent to
the participants to confirm the date, time and place of the interviews. For the interviews
held on the campus, the president reserved an accessible private room for the interviews.
Several participants at both institutions were unable to travel to the campus or
unavailable to be interviewed during the week the researcher was on campus. Alternative
sites and dates were negotiated with the participants to conduct the interviews.
Those participants that emerged through the “snowball”, “chaining” or
“networking” sampling process (Creswell, 2005; McMillian & Schumacher, 2006 &
Merriam, 2002) process were contacted with the same communication protocol as other
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participants in the study. In addition, at one case study site two participants that had
initially agreed to participate decided they did not want to be interviewed for the study.
The president at this institution was asked to submit substitute names and the contact
protocol was used to secure their participation. The additional interviews requiring
several visits back to the research sites. There were 46 interviews conducted between
March 2011 and November 2011 at the two research sites; 22 interviews for Mississippi
College and 24 interviews for Georgetown College.

Data Analysis
“Qualitative data analysis is primarily an inductive process of organizing data into
categories and identifying patterns (i.e. relationships) among the categories” (McMillan
& Schumacher, 2006). Yin (2003) indicates that there are three strategies for analyzing
case study evidence and data. A “theoretical proposition” strategy is the “first and most
preferred” because it “follows the theoretical proposition that led to the study” (p. 111).
This indicates there was a “theoretical proposition” that already had a presupposition
which informed the study, the research questions, review of literature and new
hypothesis. Second, a “rival explanation” (p.112) attempts to examine existing research
or theories and determine if alternative explanations can be formulated. And third, a
“case descriptive” (p. 112) approach examines the organization in the particular case.
The “case descriptive” strategy is the least developed and generally utilized as a last
resort when the “theoretical proposition” or “rival explanation” strategies do not apply.

70

The researcher chose the theoretical proposition approach to analysis to determine
the initial coding system of the data. After the interviews were transcribed, they were
read and compared for accuracy with the field notes. During the initial reading of the
transcripts, themes were identified with “[t]he ultimate goal of qualitative research is to
make general statements about the relationships among the categories by discovering
patterns in the data.” (McMillan and Schumacher, 2006, p. 373). As the patterns
emerged from the interviews, the patterns were then triangulated with the documents and
observations to begin evaluating the trustworthiness of the data by creating a crossvalidation process. Once the data was cross-validated, the patterns were arranged in an
ordering process (Yin, 116). According to McMillan and Schumacher (2006), ordering
categories in patterns allows for the researcher to (1) show changes that occur over time,
during an event or throughout a process, or (2) demonstrate a logical pattern of
relationship either between or within the patterns.
After each separate case analysis and narrative developed for each institution, a
cross-case analysis was utilized to synthesize the two cases (Miles and Huberman, 1994;
Yin 2003). Miles and Huberman (1994), point out two reasons for utilizing cross-case
analysis for multi-case studies: (1) they increase the generalizability of the study and (2)
they develop a deeper “understanding and explanation” (p. 173) of the phenomenon. Yin
(2003) states that when two or more cases are used in a study, the “technique is especially
relevant”…and [t]he analysis is likely to be easier and the findings likely to be more
robust than having a single case” (p. 133).
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According to Miles and Huberman (1984) there are two methods for analysis;
first, “variable-oriented analysis” and second, “case-oriented analysis” (p. 173).
“Variable-oriented analysis” (Miles & Huberman, 1984) is “conceptual and theorycentered from the start casting a wide net over a number of cases” (p. 174). However,
“case-oriented analysis” (Miles & Huberman, 1984) “considers the case as a whole
entity, looking for configurations, associations, causes, and effects within the case” (p.
174). Because the “multiple-case” (Yin, 2003) design was selected as the case study
method and the cross-case analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1984) was utilized, it was
logical that the “case-oriented” (Miles & Huberman, 1984) “replication” (Yin, 2003)
strategy was employed to further dissect the data. As Miles and Huberman (1984)
indicate, “[a] theoretical framework is used to study one case in depth, and then
successive cases are examined to see whether the pattern found matches that in a previous
case“(p. 174). The cases, themes and factors were compared and contrasted using a
“case-ordered meta-matrix” (p. 189). As Miles and Huberman (1984) point out, the value
of this matrix is that it “contains first-level description data from all cases, but the cases
are ordered according to the main variable being examined. Thus it coherently arrays the
basic data for a major variable, across all cases.” (p. 188).
As Yin (2003) concludes, it does not “matter what specific analysis strategy or
technique” has been chosen for the study, the researcher “must do everything to make
sure that” the “analysis is of the highest quality” (p. 137). In order to meet this high
standard, Yin (2003) states that the analysis must demonstrate that:
all the evidence has been exhausted and examined;
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all major rival interpretations have been explored;
all the significant aspects of the case study research have been considered;
all the prior and expert knowledge of the case have been presented
The research questions for this study were answered and analyzed by utilizing all
the collected data from interviews, field note and documents. Chapter Four contains the
finding for Mississippi College, Chapter Five contains the findings from Georgetown
College and Chapter Six contains the narrative findings from the cross-case analysis of
both institutions.

Trustworthiness
The determination of trustworthiness in qualitative case study research is of
critical importance to both the researcher and reader. Creswell (2005) suggests three
strategies that aid the researcher and reader to conclude that the findings of the research
can be trusted: (1) triangulation, (2) member checking, and (3) external audit. All three
of these strategies were utilized for the purpose of establishing trustworthiness of the
study.
The first strategy used to strengthen trustworthiness was triangulation. According
to Creswell (2005), “[t]riangulation is the process of corroborating evidence from
individuals, types of data, or methods of data collection in descriptions and theme in
qualitative research.” (p. 252). Miles and Huberman (1984) indicate that the purpose of
triangulation “is supposed to support a finding by showing that independent measures of
it agree with it or, at least, do not contradict it” (p. 266). Triangulation was accomplished
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in the present study by utilizing the interviews, observations, documents, media articles,
press releases and internet sources.
A second strategy used for strengthening trustworthiness was member checking.
Member checking was implemented during the data analysis. After the interviews were
transcribed, a copy of the transcript of each interview was mailed to each participant
asking for their review of the content for errors and accuracy. This exercise insured that
names, words, phrases or comments had not been misinterpreted from the participant’s
initial interview. In addition, the participants were informed that they could request an
audio tape of the interview to validate the content of the transcription.
The third strategy used for insuring trustworthiness was “peer review or peer
examination” (Merriam, 2002) or “external audit” (Creswell, 2005). Both terms convey
the idea that someone not involved in the research but familiar with the phenomenon can
“conduct a thorough review of the study and report back, in writing the strengths and
weaknesses of the project” (p. 253). As Creswell indicates, the purpose of this review is
to get an outside perspective on whether the findings of the study are “grounded in the
data”, “logical”, appropriate themes have been developed, “can inquiry decisions and
methodological shifts be justified”, determine the “degree of research bias” and are
suitable strategies “used for increasing credibility” (p.253).
For this study, Dr. Michael Arrington, Executive Director of the International
Association of Baptist Colleges and Universities (IABCU) conducted the peer review.
Dr. Arrington holds a B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville. He began his teaching career at Ouachita Baptist University (OBU), AK in
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1973. Following numerous promotions in administrative responsibility at OBU, he was
promoted to Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs in 1986. In 2001, he
became the Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs at Carson-Newman
College, TN and in 2008 accepted his current position with IABCU. Dr. Arrington’s
review was extremely help and provided numerous suggestions, changes, comments and
clarification of the study.
Merriam (2002) indicates “to a large extent, the validity and reliability of the
study depends upon the ethics of the researcher” (p. 30) as a major factor in the
trustworthiness of the data. It is the role of the researcher to accurately inform the
participants of the nature of the study, maintain confidentiality concerning off-the record
comments and protect the anonymity of sources or source material when asked to do so
(Creswell, 2005). Creswell (2005) also points to the ethical issues related to
contradictory information. This issue can be resolved when “over time, repeated
interviews or observations will provide insight about the patterns and lead to findings that
are less contradictory” (p. 227).
Whether ethical issues arise from the perspective of the researcher or the
participants, the researcher must remain vigilant to maintain integrity throughout the
study. As Merriam (2002) concludes, “[a]ll possibilities cannot be anticipated, nor can
one’s reactions. Examining the assumptions one carries into the research process –
assumptions about context, participants, data, and the dissemination of knowledge gained
through the study – is at least a starting point for conducting an ethical study” (p.30).
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For the purpose of this study, the researcher took every precaution to avoid any
ethical issues in terms of the data collection, analysis, conveying accurate information to
the participants about the study and maintaining participant confidentiality.
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Chapter 4: Presentation of the Findings of the Mississippi College Case Study
Presented in this chapter are the findings from the first case study involving
Mississippi College, augmented with information from data to highlight the themes
discovered from the data. Mississippi College was selected for this study because they
are currently one of 17 Baptist colleges and universities that changed its charter and
governance relationship with their respective state Baptist convention. From the
Mississippi College case study, 22 interviews were completed (Table 4-1). The initial
goal was to interview 16 trustees, four in each subset. Only two of the 15 members of the
1994 board are current trustees therefore limiting the number of participants in the
subsets. A fifth participant was added to the post-decision subset due to their lengthy
relationship and being elected to the board relatively soon following the trustee decision.
Six faculty members, two from each subset participated in the interviews. The current
and former presidents were also interviewed for the study. One additional participant
interview was conducted with the college’s legal counsel. This participant was not posed
the research questions and the information acquired only served the role of triangulation
of the data in the case analysis. See Table 3.1 for the list of categories and participants in
this case.
Themes Associated with the Board of Trustees Decision-Making Process
On September, 22, 1994, the Mississippi College board of trustees in a regularly
scheduled meeting made a surprising move to amend the institution’s charter for the first
time since 1900 in order to change the mode and method in which trustees were selected
and elected to serve on the Board. Prior to this decision by the trustees, the MBC elected
the trustees of the college. Of the 15 trustees in attendance at the meeting that day, 10
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voted in favor of the motion to change the charter, two voted against and three trustees
abstained. The data revealed four themes that influenced the trustees’ decision.

Trustee Decision-Making Theme 1: Conflict in the SBC, other State Baptist Conventions
and MBC
Fear of the theological, ideological and political conflict in the SBC had already
or would begin to spread into the MBC and impact the trustee selection process at
Mississippi College. As indicated by Mr. Harry Vickery, Chairman of the Board of
Trustees, in the college press release following the decision: “For several years, we as
trustees have felt the uneasiness among Baptist institutions and Baptist churches that
unfortunately are affected by denominational politics” (The Baptist Record, September 2,
1994, p 4).
In exploring the theme of the influence of the conflict in the SBC, the data
revealed that 16 of the 21 participants indicated it was a factor in the trustees’ decision to
change the charter and governance relationship with the MBC. The review of the
literature in Chapter 2 provided a context for the theological, ideological and political
conflict which developed in the SBC beginning in 1979 and eventually made its way into
state Baptist conventions, precipitating numerous Baptist colleges and universities to
change their charter and governance relationship with their state convention.
Prior to the decision by the board of trustees at Mississippi College, five Baptist
higher education institutions had already changed their charter in direct response to the
conflict in the SBC as the review of the literature pointed out. The findings from the data
indicate that the theological, ideological and political conflict in the SBC was also a
factor in the decision-making process of the board of trustees at Mississippi College to
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change the charter. The public statement issued by the Chairman of the Board, Mr. Harry
Vickery (The Baptist Record, September 29, 1994, p. 4), indicates that:
“The lay members of the Mississippi College’s board have not engaged in any of
the denominational politics in our national or state convention. We do not
consider that our role as trustees. We want to remain close to the convention –
our action today is simply to distance us from the politics of the convention. It
was a step to ensure that the college could remain true to its mission without the
fear of being shaped by influences beyond its control.
Some participants stressed that while the conflict within the SBC was a major
factor in the trustees' decision to change the charter, the overt threat to the college was
only perceived and not real. Reflecting on Baptist denominational life at that time, one
participant stated:
…by and large I think there were unfounded fears as to the facts that there might
be a fundamentalist takeover of Mississippi College and there was a reaction to
that. In the resurgence movement that was going on within the convention (SBC)
these guys were afraid that somebody would get on the board and they could
thereby take over the control of MC. They felt like this was a move they needed
to make to prevent that from happening and to preserve the integrity of the school.
When this participant was asked if there had been any overt threat at that point or was
this purely a reaction to what was going on in the MBC, the participant indicated:
I really think it would be difficult for me to answer … but personally I did not see
that and I do not think there had been any movement at all. There is always talk
about well, and maybe they are a little liberals out there or whatever, but that was
just general conversation. I think there were some things that were happening,
and I don’t remember, was it Baylor that had gone through some things prior to
that and I think they even had some contact with some of these other schools and
they were running scared.
Whether perceived or genuine, the data revealed that the conflict within the SBC
and the spread of the conflict to other state Baptist conventions continued to be the
primary theme participants insisted was a key factor for the trustees to change the charter
even in light of the minimal theological or political conflict that had actually occurred
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between the college and the MBC or within the MBC. One participant who expressed
this idea stated, “...Mississippi never went over to the convention (SBC) like they would
like for us to have gone over. Some states just absolutely caved in, but Mississippi never
did just completely cave”. When the participant was asked a follow-up question about
why he felt the MBC did not placate to the SBC, the participant thought it was because of
some of Mississippi’s most Baptist public figures who had spoken out against the SBC
and their tactics. This participant shared an incident he felt expressed this sentiment
stating:
Well you had some real respected people speaking out, you had people like Jerry
Clowers (a famous comedian from Mississippi and Baptist) running around. I
heard him tell xxx when we had come to xxx that Jerry Clowers had the prayer.
We were standing in xxx and I felt a little out of place but we were all standing in
a line there and he turned around to xxx and said, “xxx, let me say something to
you…If you folks weren’t so damn mean, we could get in a room and talk, but we
can’t talk to y’all, y’all are so damn mean, you just can’t imagine how mean you
are.” He told him that. Three or four of us were standing there listening to him
and my mouth was open but he just let him have it. Xxx is a graduate of our
institution.

While the participants clearly indicated that the conflict in the SBC was an
influencing factor on the trustees’ decision, many of the participants were extremely
pleased that Mississippi and the college had not experienced the same type of
denominational upheavals experienced nationally or in other states. However, as one
participant stated, “…since the movement across the south was prompted so much by
this, I thought a little excessive was fear of what would take place if certain groups
gained some influence in convention leadership. I knew that, at least I felt, that we had
not encountered anything in this state that seriously bothered me”.
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Another participant who indicated their perception was the SBC conflict was a
prominent factor in the trustees’ decision said:
…what I remember being discussed, was more the climate that we found
ourselves in and maybe, and I hate to use the word fear, but fear of what might
would take place if ever there would be a group of trustees who would not let the
administration function as they needed to function. I think that was probably, as I
picked up, a fear that maybe the direction the convention was going in such a way
that if ever you had a group of trustees that wanted to run the university rather
than the administration, that could happen.

The fear connected to the conflict within the SBC and other state conventions was
a dominant theme for this participant as he recalled:

I think what drove them there was what was occurring at other Baptist institutions
in other states. There seemed to be a change in the convention, and I’m talking
about the SBC and there was a fear on the part of our trustees that this would
occur here. I really think what they wanted was Baptist representation but not
Baptist denomination. If I could simplify it to that I think that would describe
what occurred.
Guy Henderson, editor of The Baptist Record, in his Editorial on September 29,
1994 asked these very questions, “What is reaction to all this? How much were MC
trustees influenced by similar actions at Baylor and Samford? How much were they
influenced by the SBC politics?” (p. 2). Henderson further expressed his reaction to the
trustees’ decision in light of the apparent relative political calm in the MBC stating, “To
say the least, most people were stunned. There has been little attempt to ‘take over’ the
colleges by fundamental/conservatives or moderates. Mississippi Baptists have sought to
pursue a middle-of-the-road course in the controversy.” (p. 2).
One participant acknowledged the action looked questionable due to the apparent
harmony in the MBC; however, sitting back and waiting for overt conflict to erupt was
not an option either. A participant parsed the situation in this manner:
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…we were watching what was taking place in other state conventions in Alabama
and South Carolina and I was talking to some of my buddies from around here
and there and one of them was xxx over at Xxx University and the MBC really
wasn’t having that much noise. We had one preacher over at xxx, which is in
xxx, which is a big church over there, was starting to make me feel a little
nervous… But, it was getting close and the bombs were going off and we could
hear them through the sky, as far as the discord within the denomination. The
thought was that we cannot let this happen to MC – cannot let it happen!

Of the 16 participants that indicated that this was a predominant theme in the
trustees’ decisions, an analysis of the field notes revealed that they still spoke of the years
of conflict in the SBC with a great deal of emotion in the tone of their voice and
expressions on their face. Some would sit up a little closer to me and the recorder as if to
insure I heard them correctly and recorded the right information. For those that recalled
personal negative experiences because of the conflict in the SBC, the distress was still
evident in their words and thoughts. It was obvious, even reflecting on these events that
happened almost 20 years ago; these participants wanted it to be known how these
experiences had affected them personally and professionally even beyond the impact on
the college or the MBC. One participant, whose still raw emotion was apparent in their
tone, choice of words and posture expressed this theme as a factor in the trustees’
decision summarized it with this statement:
But, since you understand part of the background that was in the denomination at
that time … I always say that Mississippians are fundamental but we are not
fundamentalists. So, it was a lost cause in Louisville. I saw some of the finest
men I’ve known absolutely crucified. Because of that I just couldn’t let it happen
in Mississippi… that it’s not going to happen on my watch if we could help it. In
fact, I took up for most of those men at Louisville. My position was (and I would
like to think that it was an informed decision with understanding) we had always
had a way to get rid of a problem professor, but that didn’t require us to
absolutely tear up the denomination. If there were any in Louisville or anywhere
else that needed to go we could get them to go but we didn’t have to change the
world, all we had to do was solve the problem. Well, they weren’t happy with
that. They were determined they were going to do it… I saw them absolutely kill
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Roy Honeycutt (former President of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
Louisville, KY).

Trustee Decision-Making Theme 2: Lack of Complete Governance Control
Neither the college charter, nor the nomination and election process within the
MBC provided protection from a takeover of the trustee selection process either
incrementally or instantaneously. While the statement issued by Board Chairman Mr.
Vickery pointed to the conflict within the SBC as one of the factors that influenced the
trustees’ decision, he further explained there was an additional factor: “Our charter did
not protect the institution sufficiently from out-side influences. The trustees felt that it
was our responsibility to provide the necessary insulation for Mississippi College from
the potential actions of various factions that could compromise our ability to serve all
Baptists” (The Baptist Record, September 2, 1994, p 4).
The data revealed that 14 of the 21 participants identified the insufficient
protection under the college charter of 1900 and nomination and election process of
trustees with the MBC susceptible to external influence as a factor in the trustees’
decision. According to the minutes from the September 22, 1994, Board of Trustees
meeting, at some point prior to the meeting, members of the Board had requested their
legal counsel, Mr. Alan Perry, “to study the charter and make recommendations to the
Board concerning the document” (Appendix E, p. 2). From Mr. Perry’s findings he
discovered “(1) the charter now called for the election of 27 trustees and this has not been
changed; (2) the entire Board can be removed by a single vote by the Mississippi Baptist
Convention; and (3) we need to have stability on the Board” (p. 2).
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If the conflict in the SBC, real or perceived, was beginning to take hold in the
MBC, members of the Board recognized the vulnerable situation they faced with the
ability of the MBC over a two-three year period to gain control or at worse to remove the
entire Board of Trustees of the college with a single vote at the annual convention. One
participant who identified this theme as a factor in the trustees’ decision stated, “I
logically assumed they thought there would be some device from the convention side to
change all the trustees… and they would lose control of the institution”. The fact that
the college charter provided such a glaring loophole that could become a tool to impact
the selection and election of the Board became of great concern for several trustees as a
participant expressed:
Well, Baylor, Samford, everybody was pulling the plug on the convention
because the fundamentalists were absolutely taking over and intending to take
over all of the institutions. And, so we were discussing our situation and what we
could do to stand in the gap in the event this happened, and the best way to stand
in the gap is to fix it where you don’t have to stand anywhere.
As Mr. Perry pointed out in a memorandum summarizing his research of the
history of the charter, in 1900 the College charter was amended by the Mississippi
legislature at the request of the “college to have Trustees elected by Mississippi Baptist
Convention. Since that time Trustees, other than those selected to fill vacancies, have
been selected by Convention” (Appendix F, p. 6). Only the fact that the MBC should
elect the trustees was prescribed within the College charter, not the actual process or
procedure for selecting those who would be elected. What did exist was purely as one
participant described it “a gentleman’s agreement” with the MBC on the process and had
been institutionalized over time using the method as described in Figure 2:1.
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While most laymen or clergy leadership in the MBC were familiar with the
scenario used to gradually change the trustees in the SBC seminaries over a three to four
year period, as documented in the Chapter Two Review of Literature; few, if any, were
aware that because of the nominal language in the College charter regarding the trustee
election process, the MBC could replace the entire Board with a single vote. Explaining
the process as it existed with the MBC, a participant pointed out, “we [the trustees]
nominated and the convention elected”. The college trustee nominations first went to the
MBC Nominating Committee and then on to the MBC for election at the annual meeting
each November. This participant further stressed the point that, “they [the Nominating
Committee] assured us [the trustees] that they were not going to interfere with that”.
However, one incident in particular that this participant recalled began raising
alarm that an incremental takeover strategy was being implemented in the MBC as
explained in the following interview exchange:
Participant: … the chair of the committee that handles nominations and all was
from Columbus. We went to see him. All meetings with church people
sometimes are all smiles and handshakes and when we get out wonder if I have a
knife in my back. But anyway, we got past all the way. As it came out, they gave
us to begin with three hard line fundamentalists – didn’t give any of our people an
honorable mention – any we had…
Interviewer: So, the committee, the nominating committee, brought names to
them, but when it came time for them to be presented to the convention for
approval, at the meeting, those names were replaced with a slate of names they
were bringing to the table.
Participant: Absolutely.
Interviewer: You brought three and they replaced three?
Participant: Yes, and one of the guys that was one of the preachers that was a
very hard line fundamentalists that was on that board, he got himself appointed.
He was going to come straighten the place out.
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Interviewer: So, someone on the nominating committee actually ended up being
nominated for a potential trustee slot.
Participant: Yes, so they come on the board and of course, three to fifteen is not
an unyielding situation but they realized after being here for just a few meetings,
this wasn’t a pushover crowd and these people knew what they were doing. They
were trying to take care of the institution. So, they didn’t rear their heads as
quickly as we anticipated. They were probably trying to get their powers up.
For this participant, the situation brought to light the fact that if the circumstances
happened for three consecutive years or the MBC, at its annual meeting, or the
messengers at the MBC annual meeting decided to remove the entire board and replace
them with trustees more sympathetic to the new conservative movement, there was little
the current board members could do. As this same participant stated, “We sensed the fact
that they were going to change the trustees of the school if they could, that was their
game plan”.
Trustee Decision-Making Theme 3: Lay Members of the Board of Trustees Were the
Driving Force
The lay members of the Board of Trustees were the sole driving force that
influenced the decision-making process. Reading the minutes from the board of trustee
meeting of September, 22, 1994 (Appendix E) and October 14, 1994, (Appendix G)
internal documents and media reports of that time period prior to conducting the
interviews, the 10 lay members of the Board were responsible for the final decision.
From the coding of the transcripts, 17 of the 21 participants also attributed the lay
members of the Board of Trustees as a factor associated with the decision to change the
college charter and sever the governance relationship with the MBC. The perspectives of
these participants were particularly ardent. When one participant was asked in a followup question, if the decision to change the charter was a trustee decision, he answered
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emphatically, “Absolutely! I wouldn’t say it was otherwise.” Another participant
echoed the decision as a trustee directive stating that,
…when you look at when Dr. Todd came on board and how quickly the decision
was made and announced to the full board of trustees, you would almost have to
assume there had been some planning done prior to Dr. Todd’s arrival. I can’t
prove that and no one has told me that, but a lot would say you don’t do this in a
three month period or whatever. Most likely there had been a concern developing
over the course of the year and probably some plans had been made at some point
to protect the institution, just in case.
As indicated from the previous participant’s statement, the president at the time of
the decision was Dr. Howell Todd. Dr. Todd had assumed the presidency on July 1, 1994
and the board decision was made on September, 22, 1994. One participant that perceived
it was the trustees that developed and implemented the plan to change the charter stated,
“Dr. Todd had only been on the job for about three months and was relatively new to the
game and not from Mississippi so he didn’t have a lot of history so to come in and make
that kind of decision so quickly...” Another participant was very direct with their answer
as to the trustees influencing the decision, “It was the board…the board had to really.”
Prior to conducting the interviews, examination of the September 22, 1994 board
of trustee minutes revealed that not all trustees in attendance at the meeting were aware
of the impending decision to change the charter. Of the fifteen members of the board,
four were MBC ministers and were not informed of the proposed action prior to the
meeting (Appendix E). The following comment from a participant reflects the negative
aspects of this action as well as the methodology used by the majority of laymen on the
board to make this decision:
…I have been told that Harry [Vickery] and Bernie [Ebbers] were the principals
that led in it and that the preachers that were on the board were excluded. They
did not know about it until the last minute, now xxx was one of the pastors and he
can tell you more about that. But what I see is some political maneuvering and to
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be honest with you, a part of the reaction on the part of the conservatives on the
national level was because of political maneuvering of people who were in
charge. You can say we just swapped horses, same processes and to some degree
that is true – unfortunately. Nobody wants to open the door to give somebody a
voice when they can control it all. It is a control issue.
In the board minutes of the September 22, 1994 board meeting, Dr. Eddie
Hamilton, one of the ministers on the board asked Chairman Harry Vickery if the
ministers had been notified of the possible action of the charter revision. “Mr. Vickery
answered ‘no’ because of the critical position of ministers in the Mississippi Baptist
Convention and indicated: ‘We made a decision with a great deal of frustration because
we value everything you bring to this table. But because of your particular position, we
did not’” (Appendix E). Reflecting on the decision to exclude the ministers from this
information prior to the meeting, one participant expressed that, “we were told that it was
because they wanted to protect us. There is some legitimacy to that – I didn’t see it then,
I was angry. But, I think they probably were genuine in that, but I also think that they
had some fear that there might be a reaction that would interfere with that step being
taken”.
Similar sentiments and recollections of the events were communicated by another
participant stating that:
…we were not made aware of the process and things that were going on until it
was brought up in the board meeting that day. We were totally surprised by it.
Of course, the explanation that was given to us was if we had made the four of
you a part of it, then you would probably have had to resign from your church as
they anticipated quite a bite of animosity and hostility from Baptists in general.
They anticipated that – Harold Vickery and others. It basically, I think angered
all of us at the outset. After several years of reflection, he was probably right at
making that comment. I think I changed my opinion over the years in the fact that
there was probably some wisdom in leaving us out of it. But, needless to say, at
that time I was totally shocked and vehemently disagreed with the action.
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These statements are corroborated by a minority report signed by the four
ministers and published in the state Baptist paper the week after the decision (The Baptist
Reporter, September 29, 1994). The minority report reiterated the fact that; (1) the
ministers had no prior knowledge of the decision to change the charter at the meeting, (2)
it violated the existing charter and relationship with the MBC and (3) the ministers did
not support the action in any way. The minutes from the board meeting indicate when
the motion was made to approve the restating and amending of the charter, two of the
ministers voted against the decision and two abstained, along with one layman. One
participant lamented the difficulty in excluding the ministers from prior knowledge of the
board action in stating:
They found out about it at the board meeting, which was hard. I mean it was
hard. They were in sympathy with the fact that maybe something should have
been done, but they also wanted to hit the door – 1-2 of them did. It was a tough
time for them. But, when they found out that what we really wanted to ultimately
accomplish was to preserve the institution for all Baptists rather than for a select
few who had ……had all the answers before we get there. We didn’t have all of
the answers and will never have and they did. That was a very difficult thing.
Another participant described the situation in these terms:
The board met with the understanding all of the board, we let every trustee [lay
member] know what was coming. We were prepared. Had everyone vote and
knew what was going to happen before time, but these guys were very hurt, the
preachers.

The previous comments and further findings of the September 22, 1994 board
meeting minutes indicated that trustees, particularly the 10 laymen who approved the
motion, unilaterally executed the decision to change the charter. During the meeting, Dr.
Hamilton requested to know if Dr. Todd was aware of or participated in the plans of the
decision. According to the minutes from the meeting, “Mr. Vickery indicated that he [Dr.
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Todd] had not been involved, but that he was advised a few days ago that this would be
presented to this meeting”. This notion that the trustees were the primary power source
behind the decision was supported by these comments from a participant, “I think my
general impression was that it was probably driven by trustees… It was always – since
we always got the impression that not much happened here that was not either directly or
indirectly from the trustees - we pretty much assumed that would have been too”.
An article that reported the action in The Baptist Record, though not quoting Dr.
Todd directly, indicated that at the time he was hired as president and up until days prior
to the decision he had not been made aware of the information or action that was being
considered by the board of trustees. Once Dr. Todd was informed of the upcoming
decision, he was asked not to express an opinion. “We did not want anyone on any side to
be critical of him, since the decision was not his and he had no part in it. He [Dr. Todd]
indicated he would abide by and support whatever action the board approved.” (The
Baptist Record, September 29, 1994, p. 4). From the perspective of seven participants’
interviews, as well as analysis of the field notes, internal documents and media sources,
they appear to indicate that the lay members of the Board were one significant
influencing factor on the decision to change the charter and sever governance ties with
the MBC.

Trustee Decision-Making Theme 4: Lay Members of the Board of Trustees Worked in
Concert with the President
The president and the lay members of the Board worked in concert on the
decision to sever governance ties with the MBC. While the majority of the internal and
external data indicates that the lay trustees were the primary influence factor in the
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decision, the perception among 10 of the participants perceived the president worked in
concert with lay members of the Board on the decision. As one participant stated, “We
certainly had a president at the time that was on board. He would like to have done it
independently, but anyway we had no backlash. We didn’t have someone in the ranks
who was undercutting us”. Another participant espousing this view indicated that:
I am fairly sure it was in concert. I think Mr. Vickery would probably agree with
that. There was actually a minister or two that supported that decision – friends of
the college. I am sure Dr. Todd had a long history in Baptist life, he was well
aware of the political situation and he was probably the main force, but the
trustees were heavily involved.
Similarly, another participant reinforced the idea that the president and trustees
acted in concert when he stated, “When it came to me, it was a unified decision. Now,
who brought it up, they never discussed any of that with me… So I don’t know if some
trustees came in with an idea and everyone said ‘yes’”. Yet, another participant stated
with a sense of pride, “In concert. We were of one mind… This is one of the finest
opportunities I’ve had in my life”.
While Dr. Todd had only been president for three months, there was perception
that he and Mr. Bernie Ebbers, a 1967 alumnus and the co-founder and former CEO of
WorldCom, whose corporate headquarters were located in Clinton, Mississippi, were
influences in the trustee decision. Several participants pointed out that Mr. Ebbers’
involvement in the college had increased prior to the trustee decision. In addition, the
minutes from the September, 22, 1994 (Appendix E) board meeting indicate that the first
order of business was to fill two unexpired trustee positions due to recent resignations,
one of which was filled by Mr. Ebbers, following which he then voted in favor of
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changing the charter. One participant indicated their perception was that the decision was
influenced by the board, particularly Mr. Ebbers, and the president stated:
My perception is in concert. I just have a perception that Bernie and Todd, even
outside this issue, were pretty good friends. Which is okay, there’s nothing wrong
with that, but Bernie had a lot of power. You can imagine what enormous power
he had – not only nationwide but locally. He dumps that kind of money here and
you listen….
When this participant was asked to qualify the kind of impact that Mr. Ebbers was
making on the college, he were asked if it was similar to the type of influence that Ralph
Beeson had on Samford University and Claiborne Robins on the University of Richmond
and he responded categorically:
Right – they get your ear. Who was the more powerful of those two or even other
trustees that I am not aware of, I may be incorrectly spotlighting those two, but
there were probably others. But in my mind, I think they were an important
element.
The collaborative influence of the trustees and president was further identified as
a factor in the decision-making process to change the charter as one participant expressed
their thoughts:
I think Howell had to be in on it. I don’t know if he initiated it, but whoever
initiated it, I don’t think it could have ever been done had Dr. Todd and those two
key leaders: Harry because he had been on the board forever and Bernie because
he had such clout with money.
Although the president had been in position a relatively short period and become
aware of the circumstances surrounding the decision to change the charter, and even
approved of such a decision, the data reveals that 10 of the 11 lay members of the
governing board were a factor in the ultimate decision.
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Impact on the College following the Board of Trustees

The second purpose of this study was to explore the impact of the trustees’
decision to sever the governance ties with the Baptist state convention on the college
administrative and academic operations, college lay governance structure and
denominational relationships. In the case of Mississippi College, the data revealed that
there were no changes in administrative or academic operations and that the first priority
of the trustees and president following the trustees’ decision was to repair any ill-will the
decision had caused and to insure that the college did not lose financial support from the
MBC.
However, the data revealed that the trustees’ decision did have an impact on the
college lay governing structure and denomination relationship with the MBC. In terms of
the impact on the lay governing structure, in order to protect the college from the
controversy in the SBC and the potential influencing of the trustee selection and election
process, on September 22, 1994 the Board of Trustees amended the institution’s charter
in five immediate and significant ways; (1) expanded the Board from 15 to 24 members,
(2) made 18 of the 24 members self-perpetuating, (3) allowed six trustees to be elected by
the MBC, (4) created two consecutive three-year term limits for members and (5) gave
the Board authority to fill all vacancies (Appendix E). Implementing this model of
trustee selection and election for the college would insure that no matter the theological,
ideological and political dynamics within the SBC or MBC, the college would be able to
serve all Baptists and students from other denominational backgrounds or faiths that
chose to receive an education at Mississippi College.
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Surprisingly, on September 23, 1994, the day following the trustees decision, the
MBC Executive Committee filed a law suit against the college, stating that the MBC
owned the college, was actually a member of the board and the board of trustees did not
have the legal right to change the charter without the consent of the MBC. As one
participant recalled, “The convention sued them (the college) the next day. I think that
was probably not the best thing that could have happened, but it happened and we worked
through it”.
Following the threat of litigation, the trustees of the college and the executive
director and president of the MBC began several meetings to negotiate an amicable
resolution to the situation. As the result of these meetings, which will be described
further, the trustees agreed to again amend the charter and allow the MBC to elect the
trustees. However, the trustees had to be nominated by the college and mutually agreed
upon by the college and the nominating committee of MBC and nominees could not be
unilaterally replaced by the nominating committee or on the floor of the convention.
These amendments and others were added to the newly amended charter.
The minutes of the October 14, 1994 trustees meeting stress through legal counsel
that though the trustees of the college amended the charter and agreed to the
Memorandum of Understanding, “the College was not giving up, waiving, or
compromising any of it rights or independence by entering into the settlement; rather, it
was merely avoiding litigation over an issue that may never present a real controversy”
(p. 3). One participant clarified the outcome in this manner:
The solution left it that we agreed to disagree on whether they were a member and
only becomes relevant if they wanted to amend it the next time. The college
could say we can amend it whenever we want to. The convention could say we
can't and then you could have that lawsuit we never had.
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In 1994, the MBC provided $2 million of unrestricted financial support to the
college. While these contributions were connected to the MBC electing trustees and
dependent on the amount of stewardship collected by the MBC, one participant stated:
Shortly after the word got out that they had basically distanced themselves and
changed their charter… I would say the bulk of the large percentage of preachers
across the state and people in churches to be quite honest were not going to be a
part of us without the $2 million or whatever we were funding them that year. I
thought that was a tidal wave that was going to happen and probably by
convention vote at the next convention.

As the trustees were considering changing the charter prior to September 22, there
was the realization that the MBC could decide to withdraw financial support for the
college. When asked if the college had made plans for such punitive action, one
participant indicated, “[t]o my knowledge, we never put in a concrete plan. We talked
about it”. Another participant indicated that, “we never got that far”. However, when
this participant expressed their concern about the possibility of losing MBC funds to one
trustee, the trustee indicated, “We will raise this money if we lose it and there is wealth
on the board”.
Even after the trustees modified the charter on October 14 and signed a
Memorandum of Understanding with the MBC, this did not minimize the potential to lose
MBC funding if a recommendation came from the floor of the convention and be
approved by the messengers at the annual meeting in November. As The Baptist Record,
November 10, 1994 reported about the November, 1 & 2 MBC annual meeting, “[s]o
messengers, unhappy with any change that prevents direct and unhindered election of
trustees from the floor of the convention suggested either a change in the way the college
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is funded or to escrow these funds…until the former system is re-established” (p. 1). One
participant who attended that convention described the tension of the meeting saying:
It was rough... It was rough! Here I am sitting there … with $2 million on the
line and you know how hard it is to get money. This is $2 million that goes in the
general fund and that is hard to raise; but the board said we can raise it. But,
when Porter (MC Trustee Jimmy Porter) stood up and said we cannot punish the
students, you could sense something was changing.
What changed was the fact that Dr. Porter had been one the four ministerial
members of the board of trustees that voted against the first charter change, signed the
Minority Report, voted in favor of the second charter amendment and was now speaking
in favor of the college retaining financial support from the MBC.
The climate of the MBC annual meeting was memorable to another participant
stating, “[i]t was tense. I don’t want to downplay it. I remember we were always
concerned that something was going to blow up. Some dude from xxx is going to get up
and make a big stir at the convention”. Still another participant recalled the anxiety from
the meeting as follows:
I was sitting beside Dr. Todd... That was being discussed. We were thinking that
if someone didn’t make a statement – there were some negative statements made
– but if someone doesn’t come to the podium soon to make a positive. Now, Dr.
Porter might not realize or even remember how crucial his role was in it. But Dr.
Todd said I’ve got to go. He was almost at the point of getting up to go to the
podium when Dr. Porter came out and made an affirmative statement. That is my
most vivid recollection of the whole convention and I couldn’t name a one of the
individuals who preceded him but I just don’t remember them being real
threatening statements as much as a denial of permitting this without possible
litigation.
The climate of the MBC annual meeting was extremely tense and when the
motion to defund the college came to a vote, the messengers of the convention
overwhelmingly affirmed continuing the same funding model for the college.
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The headline that reported the agreement in the October 20, 1994 The Baptist
Record read “MC trustees, MBCB reach compromise, “divorce off””. Quoting then
president, Dr. Howell Todd’s comments to the college faculty, he called the compromise,
“’a refreshing new day, a new era of cooperation’” and “offered his ‘utmost appreciation
for the untiring efforts of Bill Causey, the Baptist Leadership, and Harry Vickery’” (p. 2).
Almost eighteen years since the trustees’ initial decision on September 22, 1994
and subsequent second decision and agreement on October 14, the relationship between
the college and MBC has been repaired and the level of confidence and trust restored. So
much so, that over these past 18 years the college has received over $45 million in
Cooperative Program contributions and now receives annually over $3 million compared
to the $2 million in 1994.
One participant, reflecting on the current nature of the relationship stated with
great pride, “I think there is overall a very healthy relationship between MC and the
Convention”.
While another participant stated the relationship between the college and the
MBC “has never been better, which is a really amazing statement”. With the relationship
remaining strong, it has diminished questions of the college’s commitment to the
convention as one participant stated:
… other than those couple of pastors that I mentioned, I have not heard any grave
concerns voiced about the direction of this school, and yet we still have the
changed governance thing that happened and the convention still has a say in
approving the trustees that we put forward because we have a say in it also. So, I
think it has worked out good for everybody.
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Chapter 5: Presentation of the Findings of the Georgetown College Case Study

Presented in this chapter are the findings from the second case involving
Georgetown College and augmented with information from data to highlight the themes
discovered from the data. The selection of Georgetown College for this study was based
on the fact that the institution is one of 17 Baptist colleges and universities that had
changed its charter and governance relationship with their respective state convention.
From the Georgetown College case study, 22 interviews were completed. See Table 3.2
for the list of categories and participants in this case.
. The interviews consisted of 12 trustees and six faculty members, four trustees
and two faculty members from each of the subsets, the provost and current president.
Two additional participant interviews were conducted with the college’s internal and
external legal counsels. As in the previous case study, the legal counsel participants were
not posed the research questions but only served the role of triangulation of data and was
only factored in the case analysis.

The four questions asked of each participant were:
1. What were the factors that led the trustees of the institution to sever governance
ties with the Baptist state convention?
2. What was the role of the president and trustees in the decision-making process to
sever governance ties with the Baptist state convention?
3. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the lay governance structure and denominational
relationships?
4. Is there additional information or issues of the college severing governance ties
with the Baptist state convention that have not been discussed?
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Themes Associated Board of Trustees’ Decision-Making Process
During the administrative committee of the Mission Board of the Kentucky
Baptist Convention on August 18, 2005, the committee was informed that the president
of Georgetown College, Dr. William Crouch, would like to begin constructive “dialogue
regarding the relationship between the College and the Kentucky Baptist Convention”
(Appendix H, p. 1). At the request of the administrative committee, the president of the
Kentucky Baptist Convention, Dr. Hershael York, appointed a seven member Work
Group that would meet with a select group of trustees and administration from the college
and report to the full Mission Board of the Convention any recommendations.
A joint meeting of the KBC Work Group and Georgetown College
representatives was held on September 29, 2005 to discuss various relationship options
between the college and the KBC. During the discussion, the representatives from the
college indicated they would like to execute the termination clause of the 1986 Covenant
Agreement, severing the governance relationship which was established in 1942 and
reconstitute a self-perpetuating board of trustees. Following the stated intent of the
college, it was determined that each group would meet separately, develop potential
strategies for terminating the agreement and explore “how a new working relationship
between the KBC and Georgetown College could be structured” (Appendix I, p. 2). The
meeting resulted in an agreement on principle to create a new Partnership Agreement
between the KBC and the college, dissolve the current Covenant Agreement and phase
out the financial funding and trustee election process over a four-year period as the 1986
Covenant Agreement had prescribed. This final agreement was announced on October
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17, 2005 and presented as a recommendation for approval by the messengers at the KBC
annual meeting on November 15, 2005.
According to the report in the November 22, 2005 Western Recorder, at the
convention “[t]he proposal was adopted on a show-of-ballots vote with only a scattered
opposition” (p. 3). The Western Recorder article further stated that, “[t]he action comes a
year after the KBC messengers rejected a plan to allow all four state Baptist college
boards to have up to 25 percent of trustees who are not affiliated with KBC churches.
That was among recent decisions that prompted Georgetown’s board to revert to its pre1942 status of naming its trustees.” (p. 1).
In the Baptist Colleges/Universities Governance Taxonomy of Bogue & Medders
(2005), at the time of Georgetown College’s decision they would be considered in the
severance-self determinative category. The data revealed five themes that influenced the
trustees’ decision.
Trustee Decision-Making Theme 1: Conflict in the KBC.
Fear of the theological, ideological and political conflict was beginning to emerge
in the KBC and impact the trustee election process of Georgetown College. By 2004, the
KBC began to experience some of those theological and political issues including the
election of a theologically conservative president, questions concerning trustee
nominations to Georgetown College, pressure to hire more theologically conservative
faculty in the religion department and rejection of a motion that would have allowed the
four Kentucky Baptist institutions to elect non-Baptist trustees. Exploring the theme of
the ongoing conflict within the SBC and emerging issues in the KBC, the data revealed
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that 20 of the 22 participants indicated that conflict was a factor in the trustees’ decision
to change the charter and governance relationship with the KBC.
The political and theological conflict of the SBC, and subsequently within the
KBC, appeared in the national media. As The New York Times reported in July, 2006, the
conflict which emerged between the KBC and Georgetown College was a primary
influencing factor that led the trustees to make the decision to sever governance ties
between the two entities. When the president of the KBC asked the college president “to
consider hiring for its religion department someone who would teach a literal
interpretation of the Bible”, the president indicated that “it was among the last straws in a
struggle that had involved issues like who could be on the board of trustees”
(www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/education/22baptist.html, p. 2).
One participant articulated the issue related to trustee selection in the following
statement:
The concern that, at that time, the KBC had the ability to name the trustees to
Georgetown College, and this was a time when the KBC was being perceived as
becoming more conservative in its thinking and was naming trustees that reflected
that. This was at least the perception from the Georgetown side of the aisle and
she wanted/desired more input, if not freedom in that process of selecting her own
trustees, not just for academic reasons, but also the ability to name trustees that
had the potential to help her reach her financial goals as well.
Expressing concern of the ability of the KBC to elect the college trustees and the
emerging theologically conservative shift in the KBC, one participant said:
The problem is that our trustees were winding up being more and more
conservative and that was not an issue until the fact that we were not able to bring
people who had been alumnus in our school who have been very successful
business people because they lived out of state. Now there was some give on that.
I think we were allowed to have four out-of-state trustees, which was part of
it….it wasn’t just an all or nothing. It was an accordion type of thing which eased
the pressure. We needed to be able to draw on people that weren’t necessarily
Baptists for our trustee board for our support and they weren’t going to be
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supported as a trustee. We also needed to be able to expand our reach of
influence.
Reflecting on the issues that brought the president and trustees to the ultimate
decision that it was time to sever governance ties between the KBC and college, another
participant stated:
Now, I think that the president expressed a desire, I can’t remember if the trustees
had taken action for them to go on their own or whether he had expressed that,
and that followed the election of a conservative president in Kentucky and that
was something of a surprise. We were meeting at the St. Matthews Baptist
Church and Dr. Hershael York was elected convention president and he was
pastor of Buck Run in Frankfort and also professor of preaching and maybe an
assistant dean at the seminary. He was elected not by a strong margin, but I think
that created some concern for Georgetown. There had been some concern about
their trustee nominees.
The control of the trustee election process by the KBC and the impact it could
make on the college had been a topic of discussion among trustees for several years as
this participant indicated:
…we talked about that for quite a few years before we ever really got there. More
from the concern of protecting Georgetown and the understanding that the KBC
really did control Georgetown by virtue of the fact that they elected the board of
trustees. To my knowledge, there had never really been any issues with that but
just that they could… So when you start seeing some power struggles within the
body that control the election of your trustees there are some concerns. Very
early on there were discussions about what would our options be.
This participant also indicated during that same KBC meeting a motion to allow
the Kentucky Baptist colleges to have non-Baptist trustees was rejected was also a factor
of the trustees’ decision. He continued saying, “I think in the long perspective of things
there was probably some excessive concern over the direction that the KBC was going to
go because of those two incidents.”
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While some participants indicated concern over the theological and political shift
as having a potential impact on trustee selection, several other participants stated that this
type of influence had already occurred:
… there were a number of good candidates for board of trustee members who
were not approved and it was coming to a point to where the convention, some
people in the convention, wanted to stack the board with very conservative
members… I think it was mainly about the issue of appointing the trustees and I
don’t think there was one specific event but a growing….the vision of KBC was
different from Georgetown and Bill Crouch. So, that was getting to be a struggle.
Another participant identified previous influences of the KBC in the college’s
trustee selection process which added to the developing conflict, indicating that:
… at that time I think at xxx (Baptist Church) there were 4-5 church members
who were trustees and another church member was recommended by Dr. Crouch
to serve on the board and this person was turned down by the convention. I don’t
think that was in the convention meeting but it was turned down by the
nominating committee. The reason that we heard and I think it is true, was
because there were already too many trustees from xxx Baptist Church. So, I
suppose prior to that time election of trustees was pretty much an automatic once
the president suggested those/nominated those so that became an issue of hey
looks like we are losing control of the trustees.

From the Review of Literature in Chapter 2, it was established that the KBC did
not own the Baptist higher education institutions in the Commonwealth. As referenced in
Chapter 2, and the Covenant Agreement between the KBC and respective institution, the
documents clearly indicate that the trustees are elected by the convention, but hold the
college in trust as a separate corporate institution.
Mr. Charles Barnes, Chair of the KBC Work Group, emphasized this point to the
messengers during the KBC annual meeting in November, 2005, stating, “…the
Kentucky Baptist Convention has never owned Georgetown College… In fact,
Georgetown College is older than the Kentucky Baptist Convention and it was only in
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1942 that the convention started electing trustees of Georgetown College” (The Western
Recorder, November 22, 2005, p. 1).
One participant expressed clear displeasure with the fact that the KBC could
influence the trustee selection process even though the KBC did not own or establish the
institution, stating it in this manner:
Well, to me it was the control of the trustees and administration hiring, just
control in general. You can go as far as you want to go there. But you know that
implication is always there if there is an institution that feels like it had
permanency there and it was established before the other. That is not the case
with Georgetown. Georgetown has such an old heritage and it was before the
KBC.

Trustee Decision-Making Theme 2: Academic Reputation of the College
The desire to elevate and enhance the academic status of the college by achieving
Phi Beta Kappa status had been a goal of the president, trustees, administration and
faculty. Ten participants identified this as an influencing factor on the trustees’ decision.
Severing governance ties with the KBC and establishing a self-perpetuating board of
trustees was one of the three strategies Dr. Crouch identified in order to achieve Phi Beta
Kappa status stating, “…Georgetown will seek to achieve that goal while ‘remaining a
Christian college, a rare occurrence in higher education today” (The Western Recorder,
November 22, 2005, p. 3).
Clarifying the need to modify the governance relationship with the KBC to satisfy
Phi Beta Kappa requirements, one participant indicated that:
…we started looking again at the criteria for Phi Beta Kappa, again they don’t
have a set list of criteria, but we started doing studies of what would be necessary
to move to Phi Beta Kappa. One of the things that Dr. Crouch did was to invite
John Churchill from Phi Beta Kappa on campus. He did a preliminary overview
analysis of where our issues might be. One of the things he drew our attention to
was the governance issue. That as long as our board of trustees was subject to the
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kind of manipulation that could happen if there were to be a decision by the KBC
to go after trustee selection that would affect academic freedom on campus that
could happen and they would not be comfortable granting a chapter under those
conditions. Now, that wasn’t the only consideration of course that would keep us
from Phi Beta Kappa, but it was certainly something that was on the short list.
They said essentially don’t even bother until that particular issue is resolved.
Another participant identified reaching the goal of Phi Beta Kappa as a rationale
for the trustees’ decision to sever the governance ties with the KBC stating the:
… vision was for them to become a Phi Beta Kappa school to get a chapter on
their campus. I think he had been talking about that vision and pursuing it
passionately and he realized that they had not approved a Christian school in
years and that was going to be a huge challenge, but he wanted to maintain the
Christian identity, but he was going to have to create more diversity on the
campus in order to achieve that goal. So I think it was a clash of some extent of
visions. He (the president) had a direction he wanted the college to go, the
convention wanted the school to be more conservative, to relate more to the
convention, to share more the goals of the convention as it moved more
conservatively.
Yet, another participant spoke of the governance issue and the college’s goal of
Phi Beta Kappa in these terms:
They wanted the freedom to elect their own board and I guess they had assessed
the situation and I think correctly that the convention would not have granted that
kind of broad representation, the convention would not have allowed a
modification that would allow trustees to be elected who were non-Baptists. That
was where the push was coming from and I think also Dr. Crouch felt this broader
representation would bode well with them as they went forward with their Phi
Beta Kappa process, I guess is the word I would use, I don’t know whether a
formal application has ever been made even yet, but they’ve been working hard in
order to put themselves in a position to where they could qualify at some point
down the way.

Still another participant expressed the need for the college to reestablish a selfperpetuating board as a key factor to achieve Phi Beta Kappa status by stating:
… to do so in a context where Georgetown was able to achieve its academic goals
as well. In terms of accreditation, its efforts to achieve recognition by Phi Beta
Kappa it was not going to happen, it would not happen given the constraints of the
governance agreement. There was too much control outside of the institution to
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pass muster with SACS or others. So, for Georgetown to ratchet up its academic
reputation which was a laudable goal it couldn't happen given the constraints and
that is just in terms of the governance area.

The goal of reaching Phi Beta Kappa status continues to be an emphasis for the
college at the time of this research. One participant described this notable quest by
saying, “[w]e are trying our dead level best to qualify for Phi Beta Kappa. We…want the
very best student body we can get and the very best faculty we can afford. We are really
working hard toward that end”.
Trustee Decision-Making Theme 3: Academic Freedom
The desire to insure that faculty could teach with complete academic freedom was
perceived by nine of the 22 participants that recognized the theme of conflict as an
influencing factor on the trustees’ decision. As one participant previously indicated, the
Phi Beta Kappa status was not only related to the governance process and the control of
trustee selection, but also the fact that trustees could impact the academic freedom of the
faculty if a particularly theological perspective were required to be taught.
Another participant linked the issues of Phi Beta Kappa and academic freedom
more closely saying, “It is very hard to simultaneously seek Phi Beta Kappa status and be
restrained by teaching principles of evolution. There is a rather obvious dichotomy”.
Dr. Crouch also spoke to the link between academic freedom and achieving Phi
Beta Kappa status in The New York Times article in 2006, stating how important it was
“and whether the college encourages enough freedom of inquiry to quality for a chapter
of Phi Beta Kappa” (p. 1) and continuing “[f]rom my point of view, it was about
academic freedom…I sat for 25 years and watched my denomination become much more
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narrow and, in terms of education, much more interested in indoctrination”
(www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/education /22baptist.html, p. 2).
Within the context of academic freedom, most of the participants identified issues
related to not having an inerrantist teaching in the religion department or science faculty
teaching evolution as opposed to creationism. As one participant recalled, “we heard the
rhetoric of Hershael York saying he is going to take over the college, he wants to put
inerrantist on the faculty. We heard the rhetoric and there was a good bit of ‘we need to
circle the wagons’… I think if he had carried through with the hostile takeover, I think
supporters of Georgetown would have defeated it at the KBC”.
Dr. York’s argument for demanding such required religious orthodoxy was that
control of trustee selections and the annual financial contributions of $1.3 million
afforded the right of the KBC to dictate the religious tenor of the college. As he stated in
The New York Times, “’I did feel that Georgetown was not on the same page as most
Kentucky Baptist’” (www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/education /22baptist.html, p. 2).
In rebuttal to Dr. York’s argument, one participant pointed out that at the time of
severing governance ties, the college had a $36 million budget while a substantial amount
of annual support, the $1.3 million provided by the KBC, had been stagnant for many
years even in light of an increasing budget. In addition, the participant stated that giving
100% control of an organization to an entity that only provides 4% of the operating
budget is not good business practice, let alone the rights to dictate who is hired, fired or
determine the curriculum. They concluded their thoughts in this manner:
The amount of money was not increasing and so it was becoming a smaller and
smaller percentage of our operating budget but yet they had control of our trustees
and we were concerned about the trustees that they would put on this board as it
related to academic freedom.
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When one participant was asked if threatening overt overtones towards the
college and faculty began to be a precipitating point, the response was an emphatic,
“yes”! The participant went on to say:
It became very overt. 2005 might be a little early. It might be more like 3-4 years
ago when they began to openly attack us in the paper stating there was not an
inerrantist on the religion faculty… he may be right but he doesn’t know it and I
don’t know it because we simply do not ask that question of people. That’s just
the way it was. That was not something we were concerned about.
The participant continued their emotional thoughts:
… there had been this growing dissatisfaction with the religion faculty on the part
of the more fundamental leaders in the convention. And some of this is rather
painful to talk about but they - what precipitated the action in 2005 was they
begin to attack us openly in the state paper here and painted us all with the same
liberal brush and so that really left us without a choice. It was painful from the
standpoint of our relationship with the churches… We fully concurred with Dr.
Crouch that this was the only way we could maintain academic integrity. It was a
painful decision for everyone. No one was anxious to do this but we were pushed
into a corner and there was no other way out.
Another participant described how the academic freedom issue and theological
strain influenced the president and trustees in this manner:
I know it was expressed by some to have maybe one inerrantist professor on the
religion faculty. I know that was expressed by our convention president. Dr.
Crouch’s response was if you get one you will want them all and he said, no, that
is not the case, but if we are going to send our students there we want them to
have someone they can identify with on that campus and not be intimidated
because of their theological beliefs.
While another participant who felt that the issue of academic freedom was related
to the trustees’ decision to establish a self-perpetuating governing board indicated:
“in getting the message out across the state that Georgetown needed to have
control over the election of trustees and to be in a position of where the college
was not having any issues with what was being taught – that was beginning to
come across the waters that the convention was interested in what was being
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taught and so forth. So, in that one year period a lot was done to sell the
Georgetown program through meetings in churches around the state and
individuals too that were I guess more of a moderate persuasion.
Trustee Decision-Making Theme 4: President and Board of Trustees
The President working in concert with the board of trustees influenced the
decision-making process. Ten of the 22 participants indicated that it was the collaborative
effort of the president and board of trustees that factored in the trustees’ decision. One
participant described the united effort of the decision in stating”
I never perceived any separation between the president and the board. They
always, in my reading of the situation, worked almost as a unit. If anything, I
would say, the role of the board was even submerged a fair bit. When I think
about the governance of the college and I don’t know if this is true for everybody,
in the way that I hear the stories told, they really followed the leading of the
president. I don’t perceive a strong independent character of the board that moves
in any way in opposition to the president.
Another participant clearly indicated that the decision was collaborative in nature
with an emphatic reply:
Obviously concert, because it was definitely not a case where the trustees were
carrying out the president's desires. This was a concerted effort on behalf of the
faculty, president and trustees working together. All of those persons had great
input into the situation before it reached the point of seeking separation.
While another participant affirmed the same thoughts:
It would have to be a mutual thing. The president can’t do it by himself. He can
introduce the subject and his concerns but it takes the trustees agreeing with him,
or the majority of them and I would think in this case an overwhelming majority
of them agreeing with him that this is probably what they should do.
Three participants not only indicated the collective power of the trustees and
president as influencing factors on the overall decision to sever governance ties with the
KBC, but also point out that such a decision had been contemplated for several years. As
one participant stressed, “[w]e have talked about this for a long, long time – probably as
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long as Bill has been here”. That being said, Dr. Crouch has been the president of
Georgetown since 1993, 12 years prior to the actual decision.
Yet another participant stated, [t]here was discussion over several years with the
executive committee” regarding the decision. The following participant emphasized the
joint influence of the trustees and president and the systematic planning that occurred
prior to the decision in stating:
I think it was done in concert. Just from what I see, I grant you that I was
coming in late in the process and by then Dr. Crouch had already made some
strategic decisions on how to reshape the board so that by the time I was
witnessing what was happening with the board, they had already gone there.
They had already been convinced of the value of this shift in governance…
Again, my inclination is to say it was a strategy that was worked out in concert.
I’m going to say it originated with the president but my sense of things is that he
worked with existing forces in the board.

Trustee Decision-Making Theme 5: President’s Significant Influence on the Board of
Trustees’ Decision
The president provided significant influence on the board of trustees to make the
decision. Eight of the 22 participants indicated their perception was the president acted
as the primary source of influence on the trustees’ decision. Answering the follow-up
question as to who perceived the presidential influence on the trustees, one participant
said, “I’m going to say Dr. Crouch is the primary mover. Without Dr. Crouch it could
not have been done, in my opinion. The trustees have a great deal of confidence in Dr.
Crouch…”. The president’s influence on the trustees’ decision-making process was
expressed by another participant in this manner:
I would say that the initial thought originated with Crouch. I would think it did
because just knowing him as a person and knowing how he operated, because he
was passionate about this as the right decision but I don’t think we would have
had that passion if it hadn’t germinated with him.
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This same participant further indicated that:
I think there were a few members on that board that felt very strongly about this.
I think Dr. Crouch felt very strongly about it too simply because he saw it as a
way to achieve his long-term objectives. I don’t believe there was much
disagreement among the board, but I suspect that there were a limited number of
board members along with Dr. Crouch who actually led the parade so to speak.
Another participant echoed the same sentiment, stating, “I think Bill was the
leading force there, but this was something that was strongly supported”. Still, another
participant stated it this way, “It would not have been done without Bill. I would say
driven by Bill, yes. Now that doesn’t mean he pulled the trustees kicking and screaming
but definitely driven”. Ultimately, the trustees were responsible for executing the vote to
initiate the process; however, the president appeared to have stated a sufficient case to the
board for an affirmative vote. One participant remembering the process said, “…I think
once the president recommended this plan that the trustees bought into it and it was in
concert from there. As I recall, the push early on came from the president”. While
another participant indicated, “…the perception I’ve heard is that it was a presidential
decision and that he persuaded the trustees it was the right thing to do”. The persuasive
nature of the president was again described as one participant indicated, “I think it takes
to some extent, your president to start the ball rolling. Because he is so much more
intimately involved in what is going on…(however) we were right on board”.
The findings from the data from Georgetown College indicate that trustees made
their decision to sever governance ties with the KBC based on five factors; (1) the
continued conflict within the KBC, (2) the desire in increase the academic profile of the
college by achieving Phi Beta Kappa status, (3) the assurance that faculty would be able
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to teach with academic freedom, (4) the president and board of trustees collectively
planned and implemented the decision to change the charter and (4) the president was
primary motivator encouraging the trustees to make the decision regarding the charter
change.

Impact on the College following the Board of Trustees
The second purpose of this study was to explore the impact of the trustees’
decision to sever the governance ties with the Baptist state convention on the college
administrative and academic operations, college lay governance structure and
denominational relationships. In the case of Georgetown College, the data revealed that
there were no changes to the administrative or academic operations and primary attention
was given to the negotiation of an amicable four-year transition process. However, the
changes to lay governance structure and denominational relationship with the KBC were
monumental.
During the initial meeting of the seven members of the KBC Work Group and the
seven representatives of Georgetown College on September 29, 2005, the trustees and
president of the college informed the KBC Work Group that they had decided to
reestablish a self-perpetuating governing board which would allow for the appointment of
non-Baptist trustees. The rationale for this decision was that in order to achieve the longrange goals of the college, increased financial resources would be required and
appointing Baptist and non-Baptist, that the KBC would not otherwise elect, would be
essential. As the report on the KBC Work Group (Appendix H) indicates, “it is noted
that this trustee change would dissolve the Covenant Agreement between Georgetown
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College and the Kentucky Baptist Convention and Georgetown would no longer be an
institution or agency of the KBC” (p. 2).
The Review of Literature in Chapter 2 indicated the KBC began to examine the
legal relationship between the convention and all agencies in 1985. In 1986, the KBC
and each of its agencies signed separate Covenant Agreements that would serve as a
framework for the joint relationship between the entities. Within the agreements were
also provisions for dissolving the relationship. The Covenant Agreement between the
KBC and the college acknowledges that, “[i]n 1942, a change was made in the charter of
Georgetown College to allow the General Association of Baptist in Kentucky (later the
KBC) to elect the trustees of the college” (p. 3) and “[t]his agreement shall not terminate
except on notification of one party to the other at a meeting of the Kentucky Baptist
Convention in annual session at least four (4) years prior to the date of said terminations”
(Appendix I, p. 9).
One participant extolled the value of the Covenant Agreement and its
development as the tool that guided the negotiations and helped build a coalition between
the KBC Work Group and the college representative indicating:
Now, Bill Marshall (Executive Director of the KBC when the Covenant
Agreement was developed) was the one who really saw the future and who
initiated this Covenant Agreement. Some of the trustees felt they were forced into
signing the agreement and didn’t like the agreement at all because they felt it was
tying us closer to the convention when in fact it was the covenant that allowed us
to do some of the legal maneuvering we did in the later years.
Another participant acknowledged the wisdom of creating the Covenant
Agreement and the fact that it provided a built in mechanism for positive negotiation and
legal cooperation, in stating:
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Dr. Bill Marshall… established Covenant Agreements between the KBC and all
the entities. Those agreements stated in essence that funding sort of gave the right
to elect trustees. In other words, electing trustees was connected to funding.
Those agreements also set forth some general guidelines for how we work
together and how we would dissolve the relationship if that time came. It
required a four year notice as to the desire to end the relationship and that could
be done by either party.
However, after reviewing the Covenant Agreement, it was apparent that the
document was not failsafe for insuring a positive negotiation process between the two
entities in case one or both parties proposed termination. First, the Covenant Agreement
did not spell out how the trustee election process would be terminated, only that it ceased
after four years from approval by the KBC. Second, the Covenant Agreement did not
clarify how the annual financial support from the KBC to the college would be dealt with
during the four year time period. And third, the Covenant Agreement did not have any
provision for whom or what group within the KBC would handle any consideration of
dissolving the agreement separately or collectively.
Expressing their anxiety with the Covenant Agreement and its lack of clarity and
detail, one participant stated:
… my biggest concern about the Covenant Agreement because it provided for
four years notice in order to sever the connection with the convention but
retaining the ability to name trustees. That meant in two years they could stack
the board so to speak and rescind the decision to leave. I always thought it was an
unfair agreement. It specified that the college would continue to receive financial
aid from the convention but it gave no mention to how much.
As the participants indicated, The Covenant Agreement only states that, “[t]he
amount of support given by the Kentucky Convention shall be determined by the
Kentucky Baptist Convention and its Determination shall be final”. This clause in the
agreement could have allowed the KBC to continue electing trustees of the college for up
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to four years while eliminating any financial contribution during the period. Another
participant stated that the college had prepared for such a scenario and had reduced the
number of trustees from 36 to 24 which would ensure that even over a four-year period
the KBC could not replace the current board and potentially reverse the trustees’
decision. The trustees hoped any negotiations would take both issues into consideration.
Therefore, in light of no specific instructions as to the individual or group within
the KBC or college, at the August 18, 2005 meeting of the KBC administrative
committee of the Mission Board, the committee, “authorized the KBC President, Dr.
Hershael York, to appoint, in consultation with the Executive Director, a seven member
work group to work with persons representing the College trustees and administration in
reviewing the working relationship, including the covenant agreement between the
College and KBC” (Appendix I, p. 1). The college reciprocated and appointed seven
individuals to represent the college during the dialogue and negotiations.
As both groups prepared for the initial meeting on September 29, 2005, one
participant indicated that because the issue of trustee election had been taken care of
through the reduction of trustees on the governing board from the colleges’ standpoint,
“we knew that it was going to come down to whether they were going to fund us for four
years, whether it was going to be peaceful, or whether they were going to file a lawsuit”.
In order to ease any tension prior to the meeting, another participant recalls how
early reassurances were expressed by the KBC and college to create a mutually
acceptable process for negotiations, stating:
It was one major meeting. There were conversations before to prepare for it and
get ready so we had it planned out pretty carefully how it was going to work.
When we got together… We pretty much, I think we went into that meeting, those
of us in leadership roles… on …both sides said we want to make this happen and
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not have an ugly situation like we have had in other states and in other situations,
we want to agree to disagree or agree that we both are walking a different path
and so forth, we don’t want negative fallout because that is bad for the convention
and is bad for Kentucky Baptist churches and it is also going to be bad for
Georgetown… That is how I would size up their thought process.

The data in the report of the KBC Work Group further supports the idea that both
entities agreed that creating a process would lead to positive negotiations and benefit the
KBC and the college. During the September 29, 2005, joint meeting, “[t]he KBC Work
Group members and the Georgetown representatives expressed a strong desire for a
continued relationship and that there be no litigation, which has created problems for the
work of Christ’s Kingdom in other states” (Appendix H, p. 2). The two groups then held
separate meetings and came back together that same day with possible scenarios on the
issues of trustee selection and funding.
As one participant stated:
We went back and shared… basically it was to do it over four years, phase out the
funding over four years so we don’t hurt the students. The rationale is… don’t
hurt our Baptist families who have students there and Georgetown is not going to
be able to make up those scholarships immediately if we don’t help. The idea was
that Georgetown was going to leave anyway and… to make it as amicable as
possible… and a part of that was to develop a new working document…

In addition to reducing the $1.3 million over a four year period, the election of
new Georgetown trustees by the KBC would be reduced in the same formula. As part of
the negotiation process, the college also indicated that 75% of the Georgetown governing
board would remain Kentucky Baptist following the same model that the KBC
messengers had rejected at the 2004 annual meeting. The KBC Work Group and
representatives of the college announced the new ministry partnership on October, 17.
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The only remaining hurdle was presenting the proposal to the KBC annual meeting on
November 15, 2005.
During the November 15, 2005 KBC annual meeting in Frankfort, KY, there was
much uncertainty as to the outcome of the decision and whether the messengers would
approve the negotiated phase out period of trustee election and financial support. One
participant, speaking about the relief of concluding the negotiation between the two
groups said, “It was interesting because then it had to be sold and the vote still had to
come at the convention. There was a lot of tension at that point out in the convention”.
Mr. Barnes presented the motion on behalf of the Work Group, and in doing so, reminded
the messengers that “’the only question before us is how we will work through this fouryear period’ to phase out provisions of the current agreement adopted in 1987”
(Henderson, The Western Recorder, p. 3).
Following a first and second to the motion, the floor was open for debate on the
motion; however, the president of the convention, Dr. York “’explained that no
amendments or substitute motions would be accepted. ‘Because this is an agreed
partnership with another entity, to amend it is to nullify it’, he said. Therefore only an
up-or-down vote is in order.” (p. 3). Limited debate on the motion occurred. One person
speaking against the motion indicated that “he opposed the motion ‘because we are
supporting a divorce’. Since the current covenant agreement allows them to leave
voluntarily in four years, then we should allow them to do that.’” (p. 3). One person
speaking in favor of the motion said, “’[f]or the past 25 years, we’ve seen fighting going
on in states all around us…[t]he truth is I’m tired of the fighting. I think it is time for us
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to get our heads on straight and start focusing on what’s important’” (p. 3). With over
1,000 messengers in attendance, the motion carried with slight opposition.
Over the next four years, the transition plan was implemented without issues or
complications and as of fiscal year 2010, the board of trustees at Georgetown College are
entirely self-perpetuating and no longer receive financial support from the KBC. Today
only the current ministry partnerships remain in effect.
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Chapter 6: Presentation of the Findings from the Cross-Case Analysis of the Mississippi
College and Georgetown College
The findings from a cross-case analysis of Mississippi College and Georgetown
College revealed two correlating factors associated with the trustees’ decision-making at
each institution, that being (1) conflict in Baptist denominational polity at either the
national and/or state level and (2) presidential involvement.

Theme 1. Denominational Conflict
The primary factor associated with this theme in the case of Mississippi College
was the theological conflict which had emerged in the SBC in the late 1970’s and early
1980’s due to the conservative/fundamentalist resurgence in the SBC. The data indicates
that at the time the trustees chose to sever governance ties with the MBC, there was no
direct, overt threat or organized initiative to gain control of the MBC as had happened in
the SBC. According to the data, it was the conflict of real or perceived threat of losing
control of the selection and election process of trustees that was a factor in the lay
members of the Mississippi College Board decision to sever governance ties with the
MBC.
The data also revealed that several isolated instances of conflict in the years
leading up to the trustees’ decisions between the college and ministers and individuals
and members of the nominating committee of the MBC questioning the nomination of
certain individuals as trustees began to raise concerns of the lay members of the board
that they needed to make a primitive decision similar to other institutions. Therefore,
while denominational conflict was a factor in the lay members of the trustees’ decision to
sever governance ties with the MBC; it was based primarily on the conflict that had been
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observed in the SBC and other state Baptist conventions with minimal levels of conflict
developing within the MBC. Nevertheless, the data indicates that the lay members of the
board of trustees were unwilling to take the chance that the conflict would escalate in the
MBC and impact the trustee selection and election process. They chose the same
preemptive action that other Baptist institutions had employed.
In the case of Georgetown College, a key factor which influenced the trustees’
decision was the growing theological and political conflict in the KBC. By 2005, when
the trustees of Georgetown College made the decision to sever governance ties with the
KBC, the conflict in the SBC had completely subsided due to the fact that the
fundamentalist/conservative wing had gained complete control of the SBC.
However, the data also revealed that as early as 1985, leadership within the KBC
and Baptist colleges within the Commonwealth recognized that the conflict in the SBC
could eventually impact the KBC and therefore a Covenant Agreement was developed to
guide the future relationships between the KBC and the college. While the Covenant
Agreement provided guidance on the current and future relationship between the KBC
and the colleges, and more specifically the termination of a governance and financial
relationship by either party, it did not minimize the theological scrutiny of the trustee
nominations or address the threat of whether fundamentalists in the KBC could or would
gain control of the trustee selection and election process.
As the data indicates, by the early 2000’s, fundamentalists in the KBC had begun
to implement the same takeover strategy used in the SBC (Figure 2.1). In addition, the
data indicates, that fundamentalists/conservatives had begun to target the perceived
liberal teachings of certain faculty, curriculum and departments at the college. In
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addition, the trustees and president were still aware and had taken action to prevent the
trustee selection and election process from being subverted to gain control of the Board.
Therefore, conflict within denominational polity exhibited a high correlation in
both cases with at least a 2/3 majority of the participants indicating this to be a dominant
factor that influenced the trustees’ decision to sever governance ties with the state Baptist
Convention. While conflict was an influencing factor in both cases, at Georgetown
College, the conflict was more localized and immediately felt within the KBC. On the
other hand, at Mississippi College the conflict was still more broadly perceived within the
SBC and other state Baptist conventions but could easily develop in the MBC.

Theme 2. Presidential Involvement of the Trustees Decision-Making Process
While the data revealed that presidential involvement served as a factor in the
trustees’ decision-making process in both cases; presidential involvement was less a
direct correlation and more a limited correlation.
In the case of Mississippi College, the president’s involvement in the decisionmaking process of the board was identified as a single independent factor unto itself, but
was only expressed when the president was working in concert with the lay members of
the board. Only 10 of 21 of the participants, less than fifty percent, identified the
president’s involvement as a factor.
However, in the Georgetown College case, presidential involvement was
identified in two of the factors; 10 of the 22 participants indicated that the president was
working in relationship with the full board of trustees to influence the decision-making
process, while eight of the 22 participants identified the president as a primary source of
influence on the trustees’ decision. This analysis indicates that 18 of the 22, or more than
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two-thirds of the participants identified some level of presidential involvement as a factor
in the Georgetown College case. Table 6.1 indicates the correlating and none correlation
factors in the Cross-Case Analysis.
Table 6:1: Cross-Case Meta Matrix on Correlated Themes at Mississippi College
and Georgetown College

MISSISSIPPI
COLLEGE THEMES

In-Case Participants
Indicated Out of 21

Cross Case
Analysis
Denominational
Conflict

Denominational Conflict
(SBC and other states)

16



Governance Control

14

Lay Trustees Influenced The
Decision

17

Lay Trustees/President
Influenced the Decision

10

GEORGETOWN
COLLEGE
THEMES

In-Case Participants
Indicated Out of 22

Cross Case
Analysis
Denominational
Conflict

Denominational Conflict
(KBC)

20



Increase Academic Reputation

10

Insure Academic Freedom

9

President/Trustee Influenced
the Decision

10

President Influenced the
Decision

8

Cross Case
Analysis
Presidential
Involvement



Cross Case
Analysis
Presidential
Involvement
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Chapter 7: Discussion, Implications and Recommendations
Lay governing boards in higher education, both public and private, make critical
decisions related to the institutions they serve. In some instances, particularly at private
Baptist higher education institutions, trustees have made decisions to sever governance
ties with the sectarian body that nominates and/or elects trustees and provide financial
support for the institution. When trustees at Baptist institutions identified in this study
decided to sever governance ties with their state Baptist convention, what were the
factors that influenced them and what were the impact on the institutions administration,
academic programs, the structure of the lay governing board and the relationship between
with the sponsoring sectarian organization?
Gaining insight on the trustees’ decision-making process at these two Baptist
institutions and what would lead trustees to make such a radical and transformative
decision was the rationale for this study. Additionally, it was determined the study would
examine whether there were correlating factors that were prevalent in the two cases.
Furthermore, the study would examine if the factors identified in the two cases were
correlated factors from the previous research of the phenomenon. Finally, it was
determined that the study would explore whether the factors which influence the
decision-making process in for-profit institutions and organizations would expand the
literature in organizational theory and provide a useful theoretical framework for the
study of lay governing boards in higher education, private sectarian institutions in general
and Baptist higher colleges and universities more specifically.
The purpose of this study was (1) to describe the factors that influenced the board
of trustees at Mississippi College and Georgetown College, KY to sever governance ties
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with their respective state Baptist Conventions and (2) to describe the impact of the
decision on the college administration, academic operations, the lay governance structure
and denominational relationship on the two institutions. The research questions guiding
this study were:
1. What were the factors that influenced the decision-making process to make a
change in governance relationship between the institution and the state Baptist
Convention?
2. What has been the impact of the decision to sever the governance ties with the
Baptist state convention on the college administrative and academic
operations, lay governance structure and denominational relationships?

Discussions from the findings as they relate to research questions, summary of the
findings, examination of the findings and the review of the literature, current
implications, and recommendations for future research will be presented in this chapter.
The research was conducted utilizing 46 in-depth interviews, observations, field notes,
media and internet sources, and internal and external documents which revealed four
themes in the decision-making process at Mississippi College and five themes in the
decision-making process at Georgetown College. The research also revealed that there
was no impact on the administration or the academic operations of either college.
However, in both cases the research did reveal a significant impact on the lay governing
board structures and relationship with the state Baptist convention’s following the
trustees’ decision.

Summary of Themes Associated with the Trustees Decision to Change the Governance
Relationship between Mississippi College and the Mississippi Baptist Convention
In the case at Mississippi College, four factors emerged that influenced the board
of trustees to sever any governance relationship with the MBC. The four factors
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associated with the trustees’ decisions were; (1) fear the theological, ideological and
political conflict in the SBC would spread into the MBC and impact the trustee selection
process at Mississippi College, (2) the current college charter and semi-official process of
nominating and electing trustees by the MBC could easily be subverted to replace the
current trustees, (3) lay members of the board of trustees were the driving force that
influenced the decision-making process and (4) lay members of the board of trustees
worked in concert with the president to influence the decision-making process.

Theme 1. Conflict in the SBC, other State Baptist Conventions and MBC
Sixteen of the 21 participants, the field notes and media sources emphasized that
actions of the fundamentalist movement takeover of the SBC and the real or perceived
threats to conduct the same process in the MBC was an influencing factor on the trustees’
decision.

Theme 2: Lack of Complete Governance Control
In this case, 14 of the 21 participants, as well as internal and external documents,
indicated the Mississippi College charter of 1900 did not provide sufficient legal
protection from an MBC takeover of the board of trustees. The research also found that
the existing process for selecting and electing trustees between the college and the MBC
was of concern to the trustees.

Theme 3. Lay Members of the Board of Trustees Were the Driving Force
Seventeen of the 21 participants, the field notes, internal documents and media
sources support the fact the lay-members of the board of trustees were the primary
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developers and decision makers to change the college charter and sever governing ties
with the MBC.

Theme 4. Lay Members of the Board of Trustees Worked in Concert with the President
Ten of the participants identified the theme of lay members of the board and the
president working in concert to plan and execute the actions of September 22, 1994.
There was no other internal or external data to support this theme other than the
participant’s perceptions.

Summary of Impact Related to the Trustees’
Decision-Making Process at Mississippi College
The trustees’ decision on September 22, 1994 had an immediate impact on the lay
governance structure and denominational relationship with the MBC. Within 24 hours of
the trustees’ decision to sever governance ties with the MBC, the MBC filed a law suit
against the college alleging the college trustees had violated the college charter and nonprofit law in the state of Mississippi. The threat of legal action by the MBC against the
trustees and the trustees’ opinion that they had acted within their legal right brought both
sides together to determine some negotiated solution.
These negotiations forged a coalition between the MBC leadership and the
trustees to develop a compromise that provides a sense of certainty that trustees would
not be randomly replaced by the MBC, the board would control the nominating process
while the MBC would retain election privileges at the annual meeting and the college
would be allowed to continue receiving annual unrestricted support from the MBC.
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Since the November 1994 MBC annual meeting, the college trustees and administration
have been able to rebuild and reaffirm a positive relationship with the MBC.

Summary of Themes Associated with the Trustees Decision to Change the Governance
Relationship between Georgetown College and the Kentucky Baptist Convention
In the case at Georgetown College, five factors emerged that influenced the board
of trustees to sever any governance relationship with the KBC. The five factors
associated with the trustees’ decisions were; (1) conflict and particularly the theological,
ideological and political conflict within the KBC, (2) increased academic reputation, (3)
insured academic freedom for the faculty (4) presidential and trustee collaboration in the
decision-making process and (5) presidential persuasion on the trustees in the decisionmaking process.

Theme 1. Conflict in the KBC
The theme of conflict within the KBC was identified by 20 of the 22 participants,
field notes and media sources as an influencing factor in the trustees’ decision. The
ongoing fear of the board of trustees was that the Covenant Agreement between the
college and KBC only provided limited protection against the fundamentalists in KBC
making any immediate change in the trustees of the college.

Theme 2. Academic Reputation of the College
Increasing the academic reputation and pursuing Phi Beta Kappa status was
identified by 10 of the 22 participants as a factor that influenced the board’s decision to
sever the governance relationship with the KBC. In order to achieve this objective, the
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participants indicated the boards’ decision would at least accomplish this criterion and
allow the college to move closer toward applying for Phi Beta Kappa membership.

Theme 3. Academic Freedom
What was in question by some KBC leadership and ministers was whether
faculty, particularly those in the religion and science departments were teaching from a
conservative theological hermeneutic or a more liberal perspective. Nine of the 22
participants, including the external data, identified the preservation of academic freedom
for faculty and students as a factor in the trustees’ decision.

Theme 4. President and Board of Trustees
Ten of the 22 participants indicated the president and the members of the board of
trustees worked collaboratively to determine that the best course of action for the future
of Georgetown College was to terminate the governance relationship with the KBC.
According to these participants, the president had kept the board of trustees well
informed, engaged and intimately involved, even to the point that board members were
involved with negotiations with the KBC prior to the boards’ final decision.
Theme 5. President’s Significant Influence on the Board of Trustees’ Decision
In the case of Georgetown College, the perception of eight of the 22 participants
identified the president as having persuasive undue influential on the trustees’ decision.
These participants indicated the president only had provided information to the trustees
that gave them pause and concern that trustee nominations were being questioned by the
KBC, a desire to raise the college academic profile by pursuing Phi Beta Kappa status,
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faculty being targeted because of their theological or scientific teaching and belief the
college could weather the financial support outside a relationship with the KBC.

Summary of Impact Related to the Trustees’ Decision-Making Process at Georgetown
College
While the Covenant Agreement, which had been in place since 1986 between the
KBC and related colleges and universities, served as a catalyst for the negotiation
process, it did not provide significant specificity as to the dissolution of the relationship
between entities only the factor that it was an acceptable option. However, what was
important was that the Covenant Agreement recognized the college’s trustees as
independent from the KBC and that the KBC did not own the college outlined in part, a
process under which either entity could terminate the relationship. Termination of the
agreement would allow the college to reestablish a self-perpetuating governing board;
albeit, the college would forfeit the annual unrestricted contribution from the KBC.
The KBC Work Group and the college representatives, the college president and
KBC president utilized the Covenant Agreement to establish a successful negotiation
process which had a positive impact on the messengers of the KBC. This was evidenced
at the annual meeting in November, 2005 when the messengers approved the termination
conditions of the Covenant Agreement and minimized the risk of litigation by either
entity during the process.
The most immediate impact of terminating the governance ties with the KBC was
the loss of $1.3 million annually in unrestricted support from the KBC which reduced
over a four-year transition period to zero. Because the $1.3 million was eliminated over a
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four-year period and not all at one-time, the college was able to develop a financial model
to absorb the annual reduction.

Summary of the Findings
The findings from the research, in both cases, are consistent with the review of the
literature and the previous research of this phenomenon in several aspects. There were
several common themes that emerged between each case. First, the theme of conflict in
the denomination; whether in the SBC or state Baptist conventions was present in all the
circumstances of the previous research and served as a factor in the trustees of Baptist
colleges and university decision-making process to sever ties with their state Baptist
conventions. Second, the theme of trustee involvement in the planning and execution of
the decision was prevalent as a factor in the current and previous research. And, third,
presidential involvement at a direct or indirect level was also reflected as a continual
theme throughout the previous research and findings of this study. There were also two
additional themes, academic reputation and academic freedom that were present in the
case of Georgetown College and not at Mississippi College. And finally, the outcomes of
the trustees’ decision to sever governance ties with their state Baptist conventions are
ultimately determined by the non-profit law within each state. The way one institution
chooses to sever governance ties with the state Baptist convention may not be legal or
applicable in another state. Therefore, this discovery affirms the Baptist
College/University Governance Taxonomy posited by Bogue and Medders (2005).
While issues and questions of academic freedom are present in the review of
literature of Baptist higher education, this theme did not appear in the previous research
as a factor that led trustees to severe governance ties with their state Baptist conventions.
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Therefore, academic freedom was found to be a new theme in the study of this
phenomenon, however; the theme was only present in the case of Georgetown College.
In addition to the consistent and new themes that appeared in the research, several
surprises were revealed in both cases. In the case of Mississippi College, it was
surprising to discover the fact that lay-members of the board of trustees had isolated the
ministerial members of the board from the planning and execution of the decision to
change the charter. This decision led to the ministerial trustees issuing a minority report
following the decision disapproving of the manner in which the decision was handled and
even one of the ministers resigned from the board shortly after the decision. Ultimately,
the ministers that remained on the board were able to rebuild relationships with their
fellow lay board members and they even played a vital role in MBC negotiating and
ratifying the new charter relationship with the college and insuring that funding was not
eliminated during the MBC annual meeting.
A second discovery was that the Mississippi College case is the only instance
where a state Baptist convention has brought legal action against the college or university
following the trustees’ action to sever governance ties. In fact, the legal action still has
not been resolved and is actually an open case with only the newly negotiated charter
keeping the suit filed by the MBC from moving forward in the courts.
Also in the case of Mississippi College it was surprising to see the trustees
moving forward on such a critical decision of severing governance ties with the MBC
having a president who had only been on the job for three months. Another interesting
surprise in the findings was, though Dr. Howell Todd was Baptist, he had never been a
college president, was not a native Mississippian, was not a graduate from a Baptist
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college or university and had not served in an administrative role in Baptist higher
education. The previous research indicated that Baptist institutions that had made this
same decision had presidents that had served no less than ten years at the institution, had
been involved in Baptist higher education either as a faculty member or administrator
most of their careers, were an alumnus of a Baptist institution and several were alumni of
the institution they were serving as president.
In the case of Georgetown College, it was surprising to see that while the
fundamentalist takeover of the SBC and many state Baptist Conventions was complete by
the mid-1990’s it took another 20 years before the group was able to affect the KBC and
arrive at the point the trustees felt they needed to take action. It was also surprising how
the KBC Work Group and trustees utilized the Covenant Agreement to negotiate a
harmonious settlement to terminate the governance and funding relationship. Such a
peaceful resolution to these governance debates in Baptist higher education is an
anomaly.

Methodological Considerations
A qualitative case study research design was determined to be the most
appropriate method to answer the research questions. In-depth interviews were utilized
to garner a rich and thick source of data in order to thoroughly explore the phenomenon.
During the writing of the prospectus, the researcher had made preliminary contact with
the presidents of two institutions that fit the institutional profiles of the study; Dr.
Thomas Corts, President of Samford University, AL and Dr. Kirby Godsey President of
Mercer University. Both presidents initially agreed that the institution would participate
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in the research. Following the approval of the prospectus, Dr. Corts died suddenly of a
heart attack and Dr. Godsey announced his retirement. Once the new presidents were on
board, the researcher made contact with each of them to ask if they would allow the
research to move forward with the institutions; however, at that time both were unwilling
to participate in the research. This required approaching two other institutions that met
the studies institutional profile to consider participating in the research. Fortunately, Dr.
Lee Royce President of Mississippi College and Dr. William Crouch President of
Georgetown College, KY agreed to participate.
After receiving formal approval from the presidents of their participation, each
president was asked to make recommendations for potential participants from the board
of trustees, administration and faculty. There were 55 requests for consideration of
participants and 46 responded positively. All 46 participants were willing and
forthcoming with the information they provided in the interviews. In addition, the
participants were willing to provide names of other individuals that would be beneficial
in terms of further details regarding the research.
The presidents of the two institutions and their administrative staff were
extremely helpful in providing internal documents related to research, contact
information on prospective participants and providing an appropriate room for the
interviews to be held on site.
Twenty of the 46 interviews required the researcher to travel to a site convenient
for the participant and make multiple trips to the sites due to participant’s schedule and
availability.
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As indicated in Chapter 1, the delimitation of the study was the convenient
sampling of two private Baptist higher education institutions in the southeast. The first
objective of the study was to explore what factors led the trustees at these two Baptist
institutions to make a decision to sever governance ties with their Baptist state
conventions. A second objective was to determine the impact of those decisions on the
college administration, academic programs, lay governance structure and denominational
relationship.
To aid in exploring this phenomenon, a theoretical framework was adapted from
the organizational theory literature that deals with the non-profit sector. The political
frame developed by Bolman and Deal (2003) posits that when politics are involved in the
decision-making process in institutions and organizations; power, conflict and coalitions
are influencing factor on the decision.
It is important to indicate that findings from this study may only be applied to
these two specific cases and are not generalizable to other institutions of higher
education, public or private. However, because of the exploratory design of the present
study, the findings would suggest future research to determine whether the political frame
of Bolman and Deal (2003) could be utilized to study other Baptist or sectarian higher
education institutions that have severed governance ties with their sponsoring
denomination or to higher education in general.

Conclusions
There are several conclusions that can be drawn for this study. First, the findings
from this qualitative study support the previous literature and research of Falkner (1993)
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and Taylor (2000). The research of Falkner (1993) and Taylor (2000) indicated that (1)
the theological conflict within the SBC and Baptist conventions, (2) presidential and
trustee involvement, (3) uncertainty of the institution’s charter and (4) the institutions
academic reputation were all factors in the decision of the trustees at Baylor University
and Furman University severing governance ties with their state Baptist conventions.
Second, like the previous research, in the cases of Mississippi College and
Georgetown College it can be concluded that conflict in denominational policy at SBC
and in the state Baptist conventions, presidential and trustee involvement and an
institutions academic reputation were influencing factors in the trustees’ decision-making
process to sever governance ties with their state Baptist convention. Only the case at
Mississippi College was concerns over the charter providing ample legal protection
identified as a factor.
Third, it can be concluded from this study that the outcome of trustees’ decision
to sever governance ties with the state Baptist convention may be different greatly based
on the states non-profit laws and the category of the Baptist College/University
Taxonomy the institutions is in. However, what cannot be concluded from this study is
the fact that severing governance ties with the state Baptist convention means the
institution will automatically lose financial support. As the previous research indicates,
both Baylor University and Samford University severed governance ties with their state
Baptist convention and yet have retained financial support.
Fourth, from this study it can conclude that the tenure of the presidents was not
necessarily a factor in the trustees’ decision. Fifth, it can be concluded that severing
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governance ties at these two institutions did not and have an impact on the college
administrative and academic operations of the institutions.
Sixth, it can be concluded that trustees at Baptist institutions that may be
considering severing governance ties with the state Baptist convention need to clearly
understand the content and language of the charter of the institution and non-profit law
within the state prior to executing any decision.
And finally, it can be concluded that the three factors of the political frame
developed by Bolman and Deal (2003) were evident in the decision-making process of
trustees at two private Baptist liberal arts colleges when they severed governance ties
with their state Baptist conventions.

Significance of the Study
This study suggest that lay governing boards of sectarian higher education
institutions should be aware of (1) the factors that might lead the trustees of these
institutions to consider a transformative decision to sever governance ties with the
denominational sponsor and (2) the impact on the lay governing board and denomination
relationship following the decision. In addition, lay governing boards at public, private,
sectarian or non-sectarian institutions should be aware of the factors associated with the
political frame that might influence their decision-making process. The “political frame”
of Bolman and Deal (2003) served as an appropriate theoretical framework to examine
the phenomenon and the cases involved in the research.
When one participant of the study was asked what other institutions would need
to know if they were considering such a decision, he responded:
137

Make sure you know what the impact will be in a worst case scenario and look at
that in black and white. Look at the fact that you are going to lose the dollars, can
you live with that? Hoping that you don’t, that’s what it comes down to – the
money. Then, are you willing to pay the price in time, and in mental effort to reknit those connections once the interruption occurs. If you can overcome the
money and overcome the relationships you can make it work.

Recommendations for Future Research
The lay governing boards of higher education institutions, both public and private,
make important decisions related to the future of the institutions they serve. In particular,
private sectarian higher educational institutions have experienced the phenomenon of
severing governance ties with their sponsoring denominational entity. As the body of
knowledge increases concerning this phenomenon, more research should be conducted to
determine if there is a continuum of common factors that bring lay governing boards to
make influence the decision-making process at other Baptist institutions. In addition,
more research should explore the impact these decisions have on these institutions, the
lay governing boards and the relationship that emerges with the state Baptist convention’s
following these decisions.
Beyond the phenomenon of this study there are several potential areas of future
research related to the current study. First, research should be considered to determine if
this phenomenon is exclusive to Baptist higher education institutions or whether other
sectarian institutions have experienced this same phenomenon and explore the factors
which influence those trustees’ decisions.
Second, future research should explore if the political frame could be utilized to
explore the trustee decision-making process of lay governing boards in both public and
private institutions. And third, much research exists that explores and explains how lay
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governing boards in higher education make decisions, but limited research exists that
provides indications as to why these boards make decisions and the factors that influence
them and the impact these decisions have.
Fourth, future research should explore whether the political frame could be used
to explore the decision-making process of other areas of the higher education sectors,
including administration, colleges, schools and departments. Finally, future research
should explore the impact of the size of the governing board and the makeup of the
committee structure and how each of those may have had an impact on the trustees’
decisions-making process.
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Appendix C: Information Consent Form

INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT
EXPLORING THE PHENOMENON OF SEVERING GOVERANCE TIES
WITH THE BAPTIST STATE CONVENTION AT
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE AND GEORGETOWN COLLEGE

INTRODUCTION
As a representative of your institution, you are being invited to participate in this study.
This study involves interviewing individuals who have knowledge of the College’s
decision to sever governance ties with the State Baptist Convention. The purpose of this
study is to describe those factors which lead to this decision and the impact of this
decision on the college administration, academic programs and lay governance structure.
INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDY
It is expected that our interview will last approximately one-hour. This interview will
represent your complete involvement in the study. This interview will be audio-taped for
the purposes of collecting our discussion verbatim.
RISKS
Although the risks associated with your involvement in this study are assessed as
minimal, you can terminate your involvement in the study at any time.
BENEFITS
As there is limited research on the phenomenon of Baptist higher education institutions
severing governance ties with their State Baptist Conventions, it is the aim of this study
to add to and extend the stream of knowledge with respect to the factors that influenced
trustees in their decision-making process and understand how these decisions impact the
institutions they serve.
CONFIDENTIALITY
Any and all data collected during the course of this study will be reported using
pseudonyms for both participants and institutions. Data will be stored securely in a
locked office on the University of North Alabama, Florence, AL campus and will be
made available only to persons conducting the study unless participants specifically give
permission in writing to do otherwise. No reference will be made in oral or written
reports which could link participants to the study.

________ Participant's initials
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CONTACT INFORMATION
If you have questions at any time about the study or the procedures, (or you experience
adverse effects as a result of participating in this study,) you may contact the researcher,
Alan Medders, 213 Doubletree Lane, Florence, AL 35634 or 256-436-3600. If you have
questions about your rights as a participant, contact the Office of Research Compliance
Officer at (865) 974-3466.
PARTICIPATION
Your participation in this study is voluntary; you may decline to participate without
penalty. If you decide to participate, you may withdraw from the study at anytime
without penalty and without loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you
withdraw from the study before data collection is completed you data will be returned to
you or destroyed.

________________________________________________________________________

CONSENT
I have read the above information. I have received a copy of this form. I agree to
participate in this study.
Participant's signature ______________________________ Date __________

Investigator's signature _____________________________ Date __________
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Appendix D: Formal Letter to Presidents

Alan Medders
213 Doubletree Lane
Florence, AL 35634

date

Office of the President
______________ College
Address
City, State & Zip Code
Dear _________:
It was good to talk with you last week and glad you are doing well. I am very grateful that you
and the College have agreed to participate in my dissertation research through the University of
Tennessee and make recommendations of current and former Trustees and Faculty members to
interview as part of the process. Here are the criteria for your recommendations of trustee and
faculty members:
Eight current trustees (four that served prior to the governance change and remain on the
board and four that have joined the board since the change)
Four former trustees who served prior to and during the governance change but are no
longer on the board
Four current faculty members (two that were present prior to the governance change and
remain on the faculty and two that have joined the faculty since the change)
Two former faculty members who served prior to and during the governance change but
have since retired or moved to other institutions
My goal would be to conduct the interviews on the campus. I would probably schedule 3 to 4
days on campus for interviews. For those participants that may not be able to come to the campus
due to distance, schedule or health, I would travel to an appropriate site. If you can provide the
name, address, e-mail & phone number for those you recommend, I will follow up with a phone
call request and then a letter. If some of your recommendations decline to be interviewed, I will
contact you for further recommendations.
I will contact with your assistant in the next few days about scheduling my visit to campus that
fits your schedule and selecting an appropriate site on campus to conduct the interviews. If you
have any questions, please give me a call.
Thank you again for your assistance,
Alan
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